Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Fode Moussa Camara, proceeding without counsel, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing immigration detention, together with a motion for a temporary restraining order. The petition and motion were docketed as Document No. 1. The court identified the governing detention framework as 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which provides for discretionary detention of noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States, rather than mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). It cited Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock for that distinction.
The court had previously addressed the legal issues presented by Counts One and Two. Its stated rule was that due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter, with consideration of bond eligibility, before the government re-detains a noncitizen previously released on bond or conditional parole under § 1226(a), or on humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5). The order cited Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, D.L.C., and Altin as prior decisions applying that principle. On October 20, 2026, the court asked whether the parties opposed resolving the restraining-order motion and habeas petition together and directed respondents to identify material factual or legal distinctions from Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, and D.L.C.
The Court’s Holding
Respondents acknowledged in their October 21 opposition that Camara was detained under § 1226, identified no material distinction from the cited decisions, and stated that they did not oppose a ruling on the habeas petition without further briefing. The court declined to wait for a pro se reply because doing so would delay the relief sought. Finding no new legal arguments or distinguishing issues, it granted the petition and restraining-order motion as to Counts One and Two for the reasons set forth in Altin. It also adopted Altin's remedial conclusion that failure to provide a constitutionally compliant pre-deprivation bond hearing required immediate release.
The operative order required Camara's immediate release under the same conditions that applied immediately before his September 21, 2026 detention. Respondents could not add restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing determined them to be necessary. They also had to return his documents and possessions, file a compliance notice within three days, and provide at least seven days' notice plus a neutral pre-deprivation bond hearing before seeking to re-detain him. The court denied respondents' motion to dismiss, directed service of the order on the California City Detention Facility, and ordered judgment for Camara and closure of the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court treated interior apprehension and detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 as materially different from mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
- It held that the government must provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before re-detaining a person covered by the prior-release circumstances described in the order.
- Immediate release was the remedy for the absence of a constitutionally compliant hearing, rather than merely ordering another hearing while detention continued.
- Any future re-detention under the order requires at least seven days' notice and consideration of Camara's bond eligibility at a pre-deprivation hearing.
- The judgment resolved Counts One and Two but expressly left additional petition grounds and detention following an executable final removal order unaddressed.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the court's existing due process framework to grant final habeas relief without additional briefing when respondents identified no material factual or legal distinction from earlier cases. It also shows how the court paired immediate release with specific compliance, property-return, monitoring, and future-notice requirements.
The ruling is limited in important respects. A footnote explains that success on the procedural due process counts made it unnecessary to address additional grounds in the petition. The order also expressly does not decide when respondents may detain Camara if he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of that order.