Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Dimas De Leon Rios filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in federal custody on October 5, 2026. The filing included a motion for an expedited temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. His projected release date from federal prison is December 14, 2028. He alleged that he was entitled to prerelease custody under the Second Chance Act and had reasonably relied on a Bureau of Prisons statement concerning his release date.
Rios said his claim concerned BOP's refusal to transfer him to prerelease custody at all. He alleged that the denial resulted from an immigration detainer, and the order states that he is subject to a final order of removal. He argued that the decision lacked individualized review and that, even if his immigration status prevented him from accruing earned time credits, it did not bar prerelease custody. He sought emergency relief on the ground that he should already have been transferred into the community and that the transfer would not burden or harm the respondent.
The October 15, 2026 civil minutes address only the request for expedited interim relief, not a final adjudication of the habeas petition. The court explained that Rule 65 governs preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Both forms of relief require a clear showing, and the applicable considerations are likelihood of success, likely irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. The Ninth Circuit's sliding-scale approach permits a stronger showing on one element to offset a weaker showing on another, while the equities and public-interest factors merge when the government opposes relief.
The Court’s Holding
The court first concluded that Rios had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because it lacked authority to grant the particular remedy he requested: an order requiring immediate prerelease custody under the Second Chance Act. Relying on prior district-court decisions, the order explained that placement under the Act is within BOP's discretion. The relief a habeas court may grant is an order requiring individualized consideration of residential-reentry-center placement in accordance with applicable law, rather than an order compelling community placement or home confinement.
The court also held that Rios had not demonstrated likely irreparable harm, even assuming it could order the requested placement. It found the request premature because the maximum prerelease-placement period under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) is twelve months. With a projected release date of December 14, 2028, the earliest placement could commence was December 14, 2027. Rios therefore had not shown immediate and irreparable harm before the respondent could be heard.
For those two independent reasons, the court denied the request for an expedited temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. It referred the matter to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. The order did not decide the ultimate merits of Rios's allegations concerning individualized review, his immigration detainer, or any entitlement to earned time credits.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas court may require individualized consideration of Second Chance Act placement without having authority to order BOP to impose a particular community placement immediately.
- The court denied expedited relief both for lack of a likelihood of success on the requested remedy and for lack of demonstrated immediate irreparable harm.
- The twelve-month statutory maximum made the request premature when the earliest possible placement date was December 14, 2027.
- The denial concerned interim emergency relief and did not resolve the underlying habeas claims about individualized review or the effect of an immigration detainer.
- The case remains active through the referral to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.
Why It Matters
The order distinguishes a request for judicial review of BOP's placement process from a demand that the court itself direct immediate prerelease custody. That distinction defeated likelihood of success for the specific emergency remedy sought, while the statutory timing independently prevented Rios from establishing urgency. The court's analysis therefore did not depend on accepting or rejecting his broader contention that an immigration detainer cannot categorically exclude him from prerelease custody.
The referral preserves the underlying habeas matter for further proceedings. Nothing in the disposition grants prerelease custody, orders a new individualized review, or finally determines the merits of the petition.