Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ivan Rueda, whom the court described as a blind inmate in federal custody, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against federal officers—Bryan Birkholz and others—in their official capacities (Dkt. No. 1). The magistrate judge screened the complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend (Dkt. No. 10). Rueda was thereafter transferred to another facility, and the magistrate judge issued an order to show cause why his action should not be dismissed as moot (Dkt. No. 13). The litigation thus shifted away from the merits of his civil-rights claims toward whether any live controversy remained for the court to decide.
In response to that order, Rueda acknowledged that his transfer mooted his claims for injunctive relief, but he sought leave to file a second amended complaint seeking compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act for injuries allegedly suffered at his former facility (Dkt. No. 14). After reviewing Rueda's response and proposed second amended complaint, the magistrate judge issued another order to show cause directing Rueda to explain why the action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 15).
That second order warned that failure to timely respond could be construed as "consent[] to the involuntary dismissal—and immediate closure—of this action without prejudice" (Dkt. No. 15 at 3). Plaintiff has failed to respond.
The Court’s Holding
On October 21, 2026, District Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr. ordered dismissal of the action without prejudice. The court found that the relevant dismissal factors favor dismissal without prejudice, particularly given Plaintiff's failure to respond despite an express warning of dismissal, the resulting delay, and the absence of any apparent viable claim. The court cited Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992), for that factor-based assessment.
The court separately stated that dismissal was also warranted for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and Central District of California Local Rule 41-1, and directed that a separate judgment will issue.
The order did not adjudicate the alleged injuries, did not grant leave to file the proposed second amended complaint, and did not decide the merits of any Rehabilitation Act claim. It disposed of the entire action without prejudice based on the unanswered jurisdictional show-cause order and the Ferdik factors, closing the case while leaving open any future action on a viable claim.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff's failure to answer an order to show cause that expressly warns of involuntary dismissal can itself support dismissal without prejudice.
- The court weighed the Ferdik dismissal factors: nonresponse despite an express warning, the resulting delay, and the absence of any apparent viable claim.
- Dismissal was independently warranted for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and Local Rule 41-1.
- Rueda's acknowledgment that his transfer mooted his injunctive-relief claims did not resolve his proposed compensatory-damages claim, but he never answered the later jurisdictional order.
- The dismissal was without prejudice, and the court directed issuance of a separate judgment.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates the procedural consequences of leaving a jurisdictional show-cause order unanswered, even after a plaintiff has responded to an earlier mootness inquiry and proposed a new damages theory under the Rehabilitation Act. The court's reasoning turned on nonresponse, delay, and apparent viability rather than any detailed examination of the underlying allegations or the merits of the proposed Rehabilitation Act claim, and it rested on both the Ferdik factors and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Because the dismissal was without prejudice, the order closed this action and directed a separate judgment but did not adjudicate whether Rueda could ever state a viable claim; it ended the present case while leaving that question open for any future action.