California Case Summaries

Javier Rojas v. General Motors LLC, et al. — Federal court denies remand because neither removal clock started and GM proved more than $75,000 was in controversy

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Javier Rojas v. General Motors LLC, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Central District of California
Judge
Monica Ramirez Almadant
Date Decided
2026-10-23
Docket No.
8:26-cv-00350
Status
Unreported
Topics
removal, remand, diversity jurisdiction, amount in controversy, Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 30-day removal deadline, civil penalties, attorney fees, mileage offset

Background

Javier Rojas filed this action in Orange County Superior Court on October 21, 2025, naming General Motors LLC and Doe defendants. His complaint alleges violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act arising from his purchase of a 2021 GMC Sierra 1500 Crew Cab. Rojas alleges that the vehicle developed defects, including engine-system problems, and that GM failed to repair or replace it as the statute requires. He sought actual damages, restitution, incidental and consequential damages, a civil penalty of twice his actual damages, attorney fees, costs, and other relief.

While the case remained in state court, Rojas produced the vehicle’s sales agreement to GM in his initial disclosures on January 7, 2026. GM removed the action on February 17, 2026, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Rojas then moved to remand, arguing both that removal was untimely and that GM had not established the required amount in controversy. GM opposed the motion, and Rojas replied. Judge Monica Ramirez Almadant decided the motion on the briefing without oral argument.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied remand. It first rejected Rojas’s timeliness arguments, explaining that the initial complaint did not state a specific damages figure or supply facts permitting a simple calculation of the amount in controversy. GM therefore did not have to extrapolate from the vehicle’s market value, the unlimited-jurisdiction designation on the state civil cover sheet, or information in its own files. The court also distinguished Dart Cherokee’s plausible-allegation standard for a notice of removal from the separate question of when the statutory removal clock begins. It additionally noted GM’s argument that the complaint alleged California residence rather than citizenship, leaving diversity uncertain, and found that Rojas waived a response by not addressing that point in his reply.

The January sales agreement did not start the second 30-day removal period either. Although it stated the vehicle’s sale price, it lacked information needed to calculate statutory offsets, so it did not make a ground for removal unequivocally clear and certain. With neither statutory clock triggered, the February removal was timely. On jurisdiction, the court used the sales agreement, repair records, and loan payoff evidence to make its own calculations. It determined that actual damages were at least $38,120.57 after applying an $18,813.52 mileage offset based on the vehicle’s $55,146 cash price, along with other offsets and payoff-related amounts. Adding the maximum civil penalty produced $114,361.71, and including a supported $15,000 attorney-fee estimate brought the maximum reasonably recoverable amount to at least $129,361.71. The court therefore found the amount-in-controversy requirement satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence and concluded that it had diversity jurisdiction.

Key Takeaways

  • A complaint that requests several categories of Song-Beverly Act damages but supplies no amount or simple calculation does not necessarily start the initial 30-day removal period.
  • A vehicle sales price alone did not make removability unequivocally clear and certain because statutory damages offsets could not yet be calculated.
  • The court treated the plausibility of GM’s jurisdictional allegation and the timing of removal as distinct legal questions.
  • Rojas’s request for the maximum civil penalty placed that penalty in controversy without requiring GM to prove its own liability for willfulness.
  • The court corrected GM’s mileage-offset arithmetic and relied on its own damages calculation rather than adopting GM’s unexplained total.

Why It Matters

The order illustrates how a defendant can prevail on both timing and jurisdiction even when the same damages evidence figures prominently in the dispute. Information insufficient to start a removal clock may still contribute to proving the amount in controversy once the plaintiff challenges jurisdiction and both sides submit evidence. The court’s analysis also shows why purchase price, statutory offsets, civil penalties, and fees must be examined separately rather than treated as interchangeable estimates.

The decision resolves only Rojas’s remand motion; it does not decide whether GM violated the Song-Beverly Act or whether Rojas is entitled to a civil penalty. The court ordered the parties to submit an updated joint Rule 26(f) report of no more than five pages and a separate proposed pretrial-dates worksheet within seven days, and stated that it would issue a civil trial order after receiving those proposed dates.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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