Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In June 2025, the San Francisco Superior Court petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 against Raymond Raymond on behalf of three court employees: Stewart L., a legal research attorney; Madelle M., a court clerk; and Maria G., a courtroom clerk. The petition detailed incidents beginning in April 2025, including Raymond rattling doors to a non-public antechamber area, opening locked department doors after hours, refusing to leave when asked, and making hostile statements such as calling employees 'murders of justice.' On May 6, 2025, Raymond followed Stewart and other employees from lunch, yelled 'hey 302,' and called Stewart a 'punk.' When the employees rushed into a courtroom and locked the door, Raymond grabbed the door and pulled it open; after it was closed and locked, he continued yelling and angrily kicked it. He also sent erratic emails and left voicemails employees perceived as veiled threats, including that he was 'going to do something that might cause you a headache.'
On June 25, 2025, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring Raymond to stay at least 100 yards from the courthouse except for legitimate legal proceedings, and set a hearing later reset to August 19, 2025. Raymond filed responses admitting he had done 'unseemly things on May 6th,' including kicking the door, but characterized his conduct as 'far more ordinary than anger and violence' and 'simply a glitch in team work.' At the August 19 hearing, the court reviewed the filings, heard argument, and issued a formal WVRO with stay-away provisions plus security check-in and escort requirements. Raymond appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the court's alleged refusal to allow timeline evidence.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the WVRO, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard. Section 527.8 authorizes an employer to seek a restraining order when an employee has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence; harassment requires a knowing and willful course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses and serves no legitimate purpose. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the court found the employees' declarations identified specific instances where Raymond entered their workplace, followed and yelled at them, acted aggressively, and kicked a courtroom door, causing them to fear for their safety. That evidence sufficed as harassment under section 527.8, subdivision (b)(4), and Raymond's voicemails about doing something that might cause a headache constituted a credible threat of violence under subdivision (b)(2).
The court rejected Raymond's claim that his conduct was innocuous, emphasizing that the standard is objective—whether a reasonable person would fear for their safety or suffer substantial emotional distress—not Raymond's subjective interpretation. It also found no legitimate purpose for his conduct because he was accessing non-public areas, appearing when he had no matters on calendar, and attempting ex parte communication with the court. On the timeline-evidence claim, the court found no abuse of discretion: Raymond made no request to cross-examine declarants or object to evidence at the hearing, and his proposed historical timeline about clerks in other departments was not relevant to the petition. Unaddressed arguments were deemed forfeited due to inadequate briefing. The court affirmed the WVRO and declined to award costs.
Key Takeaways
- A workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 is supported by substantial evidence when employees declare specific instances of aggressive conduct—following, yelling, and physical acts like kicking doors—that cause them to fear for their safety.
- The standard for harassment and credible threat of violence under section 527.8 is objective, based on whether a reasonable person would suffer substantial emotional distress or fear for their safety, not the respondent's subjective characterization of their own conduct.
- Conduct involving access to non-public workplace areas, appearances without scheduled matters, and attempted ex parte communication serves no legitimate purpose under the WVRO statute.
- A trial court does not abuse its discretion in a WVRO proceeding when it reviews filings, allows argument, and issues an order after hearing, and the respondent makes no request to cross-examine witnesses or object to evidence.
- Arguments not adequately developed in appellate briefing, with citations to law and relevant record portions, may be deemed forfeited on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that workplace violence restraining orders protect court employees from escalating aggressive conduct by litigants, even when the respondent characterizes the actions as mere irritation or attempted communication. The court's application of the objective reasonable-person standard confirms that a respondent's subjective belief that their conduct is innocuous does not undermine substantial evidence of harassment or credible threats.
The ruling also illustrates the expeditious, often self-represented nature of WVRO proceedings while preserving the clear and convincing evidence requirement. By affirming despite Raymond's claims about excluded evidence, the court emphasized that respondents must preserve evidentiary objections at the hearing and cannot rely on material outside the scope of the petition.