Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 2016, a Kern County jury convicted Michael Charles Brown of numerous offenses including murder committed during rape or sodomy, attempted murder, assault with intent to commit rape, robbery, kidnapping, and multiple sexual offenses. The jury found true multiple enhancement allegations, including two prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, former subdivision (b). Brown was sentenced to death on the murder count, plus 310 years to life, plus 108 years determinate on the other counts and enhancements.
In November 2023, following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 483, the trial court placed the matter on calendar to consider resentencing under section 1172.75, which provides a mechanism for relief from now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. Brown filed briefing requesting that the court strike the invalid enhancements and conduct a full resentencing hearing. The prosecution filed a request to dismiss the petition, arguing that section 1172.75 does not apply to capital cases and conflicts with section 1509, which provides the exclusive procedure for collateral attacks on death judgments.
On May 9, 2025, the trial court granted the prosecution's request and dismissed Brown's resentencing petition. The court stated that capital sentences are treated differently, that section 1172.75 conflicts with and unconstitutionally amends section 1509 and section 190.2, and that Brown was ineligible for relief because he was pending execution on his capital sentence. Brown appealed from that order.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly dismissed Brown's section 1172.75 petition and that the appeal itself must be dismissed. The court held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to recall and resentence Brown because his automatic appeal from the death judgment is currently pending before the California Supreme Court. The court reasoned that striking the invalidated enhancement and resentencing Brown would interfere with the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the entire capital judgment.
The court relied on People v. Millsap (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, which held that the capital judgment over which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction is indivisible and includes convictions and sentences for both capital and noncapital offenses. The court rejected Brown's reliance on People v. Dixon (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 236, review granted, noting that Dixon did not address whether a capital judgment can be divided for partial resentencing. The court also noted that the constitutionality of section 1172.75 as applied to capital cases is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in Dixon.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the section 1172.75 petition, the court concluded that the order denying the petition was nonappealable and the appeal must be dismissed. The court emphasized that its conclusion does not bar Brown from raising his alleged entitlement to relief before the Supreme Court in his pending automatic appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts lack jurisdiction to recall and resentence capital defendants under Penal Code section 1172.75 while their automatic appeals remain pending before the California Supreme Court.
- The capital judgment is indivisible and includes both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences, so partial resentencing on noncapital portions would interfere with the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
- An order denying a resentencing petition over which the trial court lacked jurisdiction is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be dismissed.
- The constitutionality of applying section 1172.75 to capital cases remains unresolved and is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Dixon, S292223.
- Defendants may still raise claims of entitlement to resentencing relief before the Supreme Court in their pending automatic appeals.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the jurisdictional barrier to trial court resentencing in capital cases while automatic appeals are pending, aligning with the Millsap line of authority and creating a split with Dixon, which is under review by the California Supreme Court. The ruling clarifies that defendants cannot obtain section 1172.75 relief in the trial court during the pendency of their capital appeals, but preserves their ability to seek such relief directly from the Supreme Court.
The case illustrates the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the application of ameliorative sentencing statutes to death row inmates and the tension between legislative efforts to reduce sentences and the constitutional framework governing capital punishment in California.