Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Judd Ander Hedegard was convicted by a jury on two misdemeanor counts of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle in public under Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a). Officers found two loaded guns—a Glock 17 in the center console and a Glock 27 in the driver's side door compartment—after responding to Hedegard's request for a "civil standby" at a church meeting where he expected to encounter someone who had allegedly threatened him. Hedegard told officers he lived in his Toyota Prius, which was parked on a public street, and acknowledged he did not have a concealed carry license.
Before trial, Hedegard moved to dismiss the charges under the Second Amendment, arguing section 25850 was unconstitutional as applied to him because he lived in his car and carried the guns for self-defense. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that California's "shall issue" licensing regime would collapse if any person could avoid the licensing requirement by claiming self-defense. At the close of the prosecution's case, Hedegard moved for acquittal based on the section 26055 residence exemption, which permits otherwise lawful possession of a loaded weapon "at the person's place of residence, including any temporary residence or campsite." The trial court denied that motion too, relying on cases holding the exemption inapplicable to vehicles not being used for residential purposes at the time of the offense. The court also declined to instruct the jury on the residence exemption after the parties disputed proposed language.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It first rejected Hedegard's as-applied Second Amendment challenge, concluding that even assuming the Second Amendment requires a licensing exemption for public carry when one reasonably anticipates a threat of violence, the preliminary hearing evidence established a strong suspicion that Hedegard's possession of two loaded guns was not consistent with a reasonably anticipated threat. The court noted that Hedegard told police he had only one gun when two were found, and he presented no evidence that he lacked the practical ability to obtain a concealed carry license.
On the residence exemption, the court held that a vehicle parked on a public street does not qualify as a "place of residence" under section 26055, even when the defendant lives in the vehicle. Following People v. Foley and Garber v. Superior Court, the court reasoned that the Legislature's purpose in banning loaded guns in public would be frustrated by exempting vehicles on public streets simply because they are also used as residences. The court also found no prejudice from the absence of a self-defense instruction under section 26045, because the jury necessarily disbelieved Hedegard's claim that he knew of only one gun, undermining any subjective belief in an immediate need for self-defense. Finally, the court held the evidence sufficient to prove both guns were loaded firearms.
Key Takeaways
- A vehicle parked on a public street is not a "place of residence" under Penal Code section 26055, even when the defendant lives in the vehicle, because the statute expressly prohibits carrying loaded guns in vehicles on public streets.
- An as-applied Second Amendment challenge to section 25850 fails where the defendant possessed multiple loaded guns, told police about only one, and presented no evidence of inability to obtain a concealed carry license.
- A trial court's failure to instruct on the self-defense exemption under section 26045 is not prejudicial where the jury's verdict necessarily reflects disbelief of the defendant's statements supporting the claimed need for self-defense.
- The rule of lenity and canon of constitutional doubt do not require interpreting the residence exemption to cover vehicles on public streets, because the legislative intent to regulate loaded guns in public is discernible and the interpretation does not preclude licensed carry.
- Testimony that an officer initially misidentified a gun model but correctly described its location and condition is sufficient to prove the firearm was loaded when viewed in the context of the entire record.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies that California's residence exemption for loaded firearms does not extend to vehicles parked on public streets, even when those vehicles serve as the owner's home. By aligning with decades-old precedent in Foley and the more recent Garber decision, the court reinforces that the exemption turns on the vehicle's use and location at the time of the offense, not merely whether the defendant resides in it.
The ruling also illustrates the difficulty of mounting as-applied Second Amendment challenges to California's loaded firearm laws without evidence that the licensing regime itself is abusive or that the defendant's conduct fell within the core of protected self-defense. The court's willingness to assume the validity of the defendant's constitutional theory while still affirming underscores that factual records matter more than abstract legal arguments in these challenges.