Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Elizabeth Ybarra was charged in Fresno County with gross vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(1). She pleaded no contest on July 1, 2025, and admitted the accompanying enhancements. On September 5, 2025, the superior court suspended imposition of judgment, placed her on formal probation for two years, required her to serve one year in county jail as a condition of probation, and awarded two days of presentence custody credits. She filed a notice of appeal on September 25, 2025.
Ybarra sought two additional days of custody credits on appeal under section 4019. She relied on a Fares letter sent to the Fresno County Clerk of the Court and later filed with the Court of Appeal. That letter asserted that the September 5 minute order reflected four days of credits—two actual days and two days for good time and work time—but that the trial court had failed to award the latter two days. It asked that the case be recalled for the limited purpose of orally awarding two days of conduct credit. The record contained no response from the trial court, if any was made. Both parties requested judicial notice of the letter, and the appellate court granted that request.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed with the People that section 1237.1 barred the appeal. The statute generally requires a defendant claiming an error in calculating presentence custody credits to present the claim at sentencing or, if the error is discovered later, to move for correction in the trial court, including through an informal written request. The court first observed that Ybarra did not even assert that she discovered the alleged error after sentencing, which it described as fatal to her claim under the statute.
The court also concluded that Ybarra’s claim would fail even if it had been discovered after sentencing. Her Fares letter concerned an asserted discrepancy between an oral award of two days and a minute order supposedly reflecting four days. The appellate court found no such discrepancy: the sentencing court awarded two days, and the minute order accurately reflected that award. Because the letter did not assert entitlement to two additional days under section 4019, it did not give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error later raised on appeal.
The court identified additional shortcomings of lesser importance: the letter was addressed to the clerk rather than intended for the trial court, the record was silent about any response, and nothing showed that Ybarra pressed for a ruling. It therefore held that the issue was not preserved in the manner required by section 1237.1 and dismissed the appeal. The court did not decide whether Ybarra otherwise merited additional custody credits; the People had not addressed that entitlement question, and the dismissal rested on noncompliance with the statutory preservation requirement.
Key Takeaways
- A California defendant generally cannot appeal an alleged presentence custody-credit calculation error without first satisfying the presentation and correction requirements of Penal Code section 1237.1.
- An informal written correction request must address the error later raised on appeal so that the trial court has an opportunity to correct that particular problem.
- Ybarra’s letter did not preserve her section 4019 claim because it instead alleged a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and minute order that the appellate court found did not exist.
- The appellate court also noted the absence of any assertion that the error was discovered only after sentencing and the absence of record evidence that Ybarra pressed the trial court for a ruling.
- The appeal was dismissed on preservation and jurisdictional grounds without a decision awarding or denying additional custody credits on the merits.
Why It Matters
The decision applies section 1237.1 as a gatekeeping requirement for custody-credit appeals and illustrates why a Fares letter must present the actual claim later pursued on appeal. It also shows that sending correspondence alone may not suffice when the record does not establish the required trial-court presentation and effort to obtain a ruling.
The opinion leaves open whether Ybarra would substantively qualify for two more days of credit under section 4019. Its holding concerns appellate review of an unpreserved calculation claim, not a determination that the requested credits were substantively unavailable.