Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 2023, K.L. filed a request for a protective order against G.M., requesting protection for herself and N.M., the son she shares with G.M. In 2024, K.L. obtained a restraining order protecting her and N.M. from G.M. until October 9, 2025. In September 2025, K.L. filed a request to renew the protective order and served her request on G.M. K.L. appeared at the October 2025 hearing on her request; G.M. did not appear. After hearing K.L.'s testimony, the trial court commissioner granted the request and issued a five-year protective order, set to expire in October 2030.
G.M. appeals from the judgment entered in favor of K.L. on K.L.'s request for a renewed domestic violence restraining order. He does not argue the merits of the continued protective order. Instead, he contends the judgment is void because he was not served with notice of the renewal hearing and because he did not agree to a commissioner hearing the request. K.L. did not appear on appeal. The court reviews protective orders under the Domestic Violence Protection Act for abuse of discretion, resolving conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court's findings, and reviews the factual findings necessary to support the order for substantial evidence.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the notice argument on both record and procedural grounds. The clerk's transcript contained a proof of service showing that, in September 2025, G.M. was mailed K.L.'s request, a notice of hearing on her request, and a proposed order. The court further explained that, to challenge the protective order on the basis that he was not served with the notice of hearing, G.M. should have filed a motion to set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). Because G.M. did not properly present this issue to the trial court, the appellate court does not consider it on appeal.
The court also rejected G.M.'s objection to the commissioner's authority. Code of Civil Procedure section 259, subdivision (d), allows a commissioner to act as a temporary judge on stipulation of the parties litigant, and parties can consent verbally or impliedly by conduct. The record of action showed that both parties stipulated to a commissioner when K.L. filed her initial request for a protective order. Because G.M. did not appear at the renewal hearing, he was unable to stipulate then, but the court held that a commissioner's power to serve as a temporary judge does not require a stipulation from an absent party — in such an instance the absent party loses party-litigant status. Under Reisman v. Shahverdian, a party who fails to appear at trial despite receipt of proper notice can lose that status. G.M. forfeited his party-litigant status by not appearing at the hearing, and the commissioner was therefore authorized to proceed upon K.L.'s stipulation.
A trial court judgment is presumed correct, and G.M. bore the burden to demonstrate error justifying reversal; he did not meet that burden. The court affirmed the judgment. Because K.L. did not appear on appeal, neither party recovers costs under California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5). The opinion did not separately adjudicate the merits of continued protection because G.M. did not raise that issue.
Key Takeaways
- A proof of service in the clerk's transcript showed that G.M. had been mailed the renewal request, hearing notice, and proposed order in September 2025.
- G.M.'s notice-based challenge was not considered on appeal because he did not properly present it to the trial court, such as through a motion to set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).
- The record of action showed that both parties stipulated to a commissioner when K.L. filed her initial protective-order request.
- By not appearing at the renewal hearing despite proper notice, G.M. forfeited his party-litigant status, so no stipulation from him was required and the commissioner was authorized to proceed on K.L.'s stipulation.
- The five-year protective order was affirmed, and neither party was awarded appellate costs because K.L. did not appear on appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established waiver and temporary-judge principles to a domestic violence restraining-order renewal. It distinguishes a substantive attack on continued protection, which G.M. did not pursue, from procedural objections to notice and the commissioner's authority. On notice, the court declined to reach the issue because G.M. failed to properly present it below; on the commissioner question, the court held that a party who fails to appear despite proper notice forfeits party-litigant status, so the commissioner could proceed on the appearing party's stipulation.
The opinion is not certified for publication and states that it is not to be published in the official reports. Its disposition leaves the renewed protective order in place through its stated October 2030 expiration, while denying costs to both sides.