Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
M.S., the defendant below, sought a domestic violence restraining order against plaintiff K.B. in April 2025, along with custody orders for their four-year-old child and attorney fees. She supported the request with an 11-page declaration and 19 exhibits. After a three-afternoon evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued the DVRO and set a further hearing on custody and fees. M.S.'s counsel then filed a Keech declaration seeking just over $40,000: roughly 58 hours of attorney work by three attorneys at $450 to $650 per hour, plus about 49 hours of paralegal and support time at $95 to $195 per hour.
At the continued hearing, K.B.'s counsel argued that $40,000 was unreasonable for a domestic violence case that consumed three afternoons of trial, proposing $10,000 to $20,000 as a more reasonable figure. M.S.'s counsel, a certified family law specialist, responded that the case demanded substantial time and preparation to demonstrate long-term harassment. The trial court awarded $25,000, explaining that under Family Code section 6344 the relevant inquiry was the paying party's ability to pay, and it found that K.B. had that ability. The court acknowledged the work documented in the Keech declaration but concluded that $25,000 represented the reasonable fees for the DVRO hearing. Neither counsel asked the court to explain how it calculated the award.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. M.S. cited no case requiring a lodestar analysis for attorney fee awards in a DVRO proceeding, and Family Code section 6344 does not expressly call for the lodestar; the court was willing to assume without deciding that the ordinary lodestar framework applies. But because M.S. did not request specific findings, the court was obligated to presume the trial court applied the lodestar. Quoting Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, the court explained that California trial courts have no sua sponte duty to make specific factual findings explaining a fee calculation, and appellate courts infer all findings necessary to support the award when findings were not requested.
The court rejected M.S.'s contention that the trial court disclaimed a lodestar analysis by calling K.B.'s ability to pay 'the only consideration that the court has.' Read in context, the remark addressed the parties' debate over the relevance of M.S.'s income and correctly shifted focus to the paying party, because a prevailing petitioner is entitled to fees regardless of her own financial need. The court also noted that the trial court expressly acknowledged the Keech declaration and explicitly found $25,000 to be the reasonable fees. Section 6344 cannot be read to require automatic full awards in every DVRO case; reasonableness remains the touchstone. While M.S.'s $40,000 request may have been reasonable, so was K.B.'s lower counteroffer, and $25,000 fell within the range of reasonableness — it was not so small as to shock the conscience.
Key Takeaways
- A party dissatisfied with a trial court's attorney fee calculation must request specific findings in the trial court; otherwise appellate courts presume an acceptable lodestar analysis and infer all findings necessary to support the award.
- Family Code section 6344 does not expressly require a lodestar analysis for DVRO fee awards, and the Court of Appeal found no published California case applying the lodestar in the DVRO context, though it assumed without deciding that the ordinary framework governs.
- A prevailing DVRO petitioner is entitled to attorney fees regardless of her own financial need, so long as the paying party has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay under section 6344.
- Trial courts retain discretion to reduce DVRO fee requests; section 6344 does not mandate automatic full awards, and an award within the range of reasonableness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it shocks the conscience.
Why It Matters
The decision places the burden squarely on the dissatisfied party to request specific findings in the trial court in order to create a record for appellate review of a fee award, particularly in family law and DVRO proceedings. It also confirms that prevailing DVRO petitioners need not show their own financial need, and that trial courts retain discretion to award less than the full amount requested so long as the award is reasonable.
The opinion is notable for its candid observation that no published California case has applied the lodestar analysis in the DVRO context, and for its assumption without deciding that the ordinary lodestar framework governs. Practitioners should take heed that even a thoroughly documented fee request supported by a detailed declaration may be reduced within the range of reasonableness, and that appellate relief will be difficult to obtain absent a timely request for findings.