Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Sarah Mae Thomas pleaded no contest to two counts of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a) after the trial court denied her application for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, and was sentenced to five years and four months in prison. The charges arose from allegations that she abused her four children: after they were removed from the home in May 2020, interviews described daily domestic violence, including Thomas pulling a knife on her husband, grabbing daughter A.T. by the hair and striking her head against a toilet and wall, and slapping and punching daughter G.T. while the other children watched.
In October 2023, Thomas applied for diversion, submitting a forensic evaluation by Dr. Luigi Piciucco diagnosing PTSD, depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse, and borderline personality disorder, plus an assessment and treatment plan from county clinician John Langley recommending therapy, psychiatric appointments, and substance-use-disorder treatment. The People opposed, arguing she posed an unreasonable risk to public safety based on the children's statements, the charged conduct, and her limited criminal history, including 2024 convictions for spousal battery and DUI.
The trial court denied the application, finding the facts so violent it could not conclude Thomas would not commit a super strike, while conceding she posed no significant danger to the community at large but finding an unreasonable risk to her children if she regained custody; it also found the proposed treatment plan insufficient to address her mental health disorders. Thomas timely appealed with a certificate of probable cause.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to the public-safety inquiry. Under sections 1001.36 and 1170.18, an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety means an unreasonable risk of committing an enumerated violent felony — a 'super strike' such as murder or attempted murder. The trial court instead focused on the risk to Thomas's children and speculated about future custody even though she had no current access to them; any return of the children would occur only after family-law processes found she would not repeat the abuse. The court's concession that Thomas posed no significant danger to the community directly undermined its contrary finding.
The evidence was also insufficient to show Thomas posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if treated in the community. She had no arrest or conviction history for a super strike, and the underlying child abuse charges were not super strikes. Violent conduct alone did not support the inference, and the knife incident — for which she was never charged — did not rise to that level; a child's fear that someone would die is not evidence of likely super strike conduct.
The court also rejected the People's argument that the trial court properly exercised residual discretion because the treatment plan did not address every diagnosis. Residual discretion must be exercised consistently with the statute's strong legislative preference for treatment, and the trial court's explanation did not reflect the statute's purposes or explain why diversion would not meet its goals. The judgment was conditionally reversed, the diversion-denial order vacated, and the matter remanded for reconsideration consistent with the opinion.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts must assess unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under section 1001.36 by the risk of enumerated super strike offenses to the public, not speculative future harm to specific individuals.
- Concern about possible future custody of children cannot support a danger finding when the defendant currently lacks access to the children and any return would depend on family-law safeguards.
- Violent conduct alone is insufficient to show likely commission of a super strike; the record must contain evidence of the crimes enumerated in section 1170.18, subdivision (c).
- A residual-discretion denial must state reasons reflecting the statute's treatment preference and explain why diversion would not serve its purposes.
- The court did not order diversion outright; it conditionally reversed the judgment, vacated the plea, sentence, and denial order, and remanded for reconsideration.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that diversion denials must rest on the statutory super-strike risk standard rather than generalized fear of future access to victims, and that a trial court's own concession of no significant danger to the community can defeat a contrary finding. It also requires reasoned exercise of residual discretion aligned with the legislature's preference for treatment of mental health disorders.
In domestic-violence and child-abuse cases where the defendant no longer has custody of the victims, the ruling gives trial courts and defense attorneys a clearer framework: assess risk under section 1170.18, require record support for any super-strike inference, and explain any residual-discretion denial. The conditional reversal leaves the ultimate diversion decision to the trial court on remand under the correct standard.