Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
David Martell, Marcos Mendoza, and Javier Alfonso Barragan were convicted of murder in connection with the 2011 killing of Maurillo Garcia. Martell was convicted by jury in 2013 and sentenced to 15 years to life. All three later sought resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. After an evidentiary hearing at which the parties presented no additional evidence, the trial court denied their petitions, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that each directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder.
In the earlier appeal, the court found substantial evidence supporting those findings but reversed as to Barragan and Mendoza for limited consideration of their ages when the killing occurred. Martell, who was 20, had not joined that argument. After receiving the earlier opinion, he moved to recall the remittitur. The court granted the motion, accepted supplemental briefing, vacated its previous opinion only as to Martell, and issued this opinion. The previous opinion remains effective as to Barragan and Mendoza.
The prosecution's evidence included accomplice testimony that Martell joined the chase and group assault, eyewitness testimony that all the chasers participated, and gang evidence concerning the defendants. A phone registered to Martell's mother was found near the scene, while his fingerprint and DNA were found on items at the house where the group had gathered. The medical examiner testified that Garcia suffered 15 stab wounds and died from multiple stab wounds. The resentencing court did not identify the actual killer, instead concluding that the group overwhelmed and incapacitated the victim while he was repeatedly stabbed.
The Court’s Holding
The court again rejected Martell's sufficiency challenge because he supplied no new argument or authority. It held that substantial evidence supported findings that he aided the life-endangering stabbing by participating in the beating, knew the perpetrator intended to stab, intended to assist, and acted with conscious disregard for life. The court credited the eyewitness account that everyone participated and explained that the trial court could resolve conflicting testimony. It also held that the gang expert's statements about the rarity of deaths in gang skirmishes did not address the likelihood of death when five men attack one person, and that Clark reckless-indifference findings did not negate direct aiding-and-abetting liability.
The new result concerned Martell's youth. Although he had not raised the issue in the trial court, the court reached the merits because the relevant law was still developing when the petition was denied. Relying on People v. Pittman, it explained that youth-related impulsivity and vulnerability to peer pressure can bear on implied malice. The court found it reasonably probable that consideration of Martell's age could produce a more favorable result, while expressing no opinion on the ultimate decision on remand.
The disposition reverses the order denying Martell's resentencing petition and remands solely so the trial court can consider his youth in determining whether he acted with implied malice. It does not vacate his conviction, find him ineligible for resentencing, or direct that his petition be granted.
Key Takeaways
- A section 1172.6 court must have a meaningful opportunity to consider a petitioner's youth when that characteristic bears on whether the petitioner acted with implied malice.
- The court reached Martell's youth argument despite potential forfeiture because this area of law was developing when the trial court denied his petition.
- Substantial evidence supported the aiding-and-abetting findings through testimony about Martell's participation in the group assault, the nature of the stabbing, and the surrounding gang evidence.
- The remand is limited to reconsidering Martell's mental state in light of his youth and does not predetermine whether he should receive resentencing.
- The earlier opinion remains in effect for Barragan and Mendoza; this replacement opinion changes the appellate disposition only for Martell.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the youth-culpability reasoning of Pittman to a direct aiding-and-abetting theory of implied malice murder in a section 1172.6 proceeding. It distinguishes youth's relevance to risk perception and peer pressure from the separate substantial-evidence inquiry, which Martell did not overcome.
The opinion also illustrates the procedural effect of recalling a remittitur and vacating an earlier appellate opinion as to one defendant. Martell receives the same limited opportunity previously afforded his codefendants, but the trial court retains discretion over the petition's ultimate outcome.