Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In July 2023, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services petitioned the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of N.G., then five years old, and his one-year-old brother O.G., after their mother was seen pushing the children in a shopping cart in the street while appearing impaired. The department alleged J.G. was the children’s father. It tried phone, text, certified mail, and personal delivery at his last known address, quickly learning the address was no longer current. It also learned J.G. was a defendant in three active criminal cases in the same county, but took no action to contact him at court appearances, identify his defense counsel, or ask participants in those cases about his location.
At a September 2023 jurisdiction and disposition hearing—held the same day J.G. was scheduled for a trial setting in one of those criminal cases—the court found the section 300 petition true, adjudged both children dependents, and found the department had made diligent efforts. At the 12-month review the court terminated the mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Only in October 2024, through another parent locator referral, did the department find a new address for J.G.; he appeared promptly after personal service, and genetic testing established his biological fatherhood in January 2025. He then petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to set aside the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order for lack of notice and requested presumed father status as to N.G. The juvenile court denied both requests and, at the March 2025 section 366.26 hearing, terminated both parents’ parental rights and selected adoption. J.G. appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the determination that J.G. did not meet his burden of establishing presumed parentage of N.G. under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d): counsel’s representations of brief cohabitation and limited parental acts did not compel a finding in his favor, given conflicting dates, N.G.’s prior court-ordered placement with relatives, and the domestic-violence record. The court also rejected J.G.’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
But the court agreed with J.G. that the department did not exercise reasonable diligence in locating him. Reasonable diligence requires searching not only standard avenues but the specific ones most likely, under the unique facts known to the agency, to yield a missing parent’s address. Despite knowing its addresses were stale and that J.G. had pending criminal cases with imminent hearing dates in the same county, the department disregarded that lead. J.G. therefore never received the section 316.2, subdivision (b) advisements—notice that the proceedings could result in termination of parental rights and the Judicial Council JV-505 form explaining an alleged father’s limited rights.
Applying the Chapman harmless-error standard, the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of diligence was harmless: J.G. was never told the consequences of nonparticipation, and his prompt appearance and established parentage once properly noticed showed he would not necessarily have remained passive or been denied services. The court reversed the order denying the section 388 petition and vacated the termination of parental rights—as to the mother as well, because a court may not terminate only one parent’s rights when the purpose is freeing the child for adoption—and remanded for a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing on issues involving J.G. only.
Key Takeaways
- Knowing of J.G.’s pending criminal cases in the same county obligated the department to pursue that specific lead; disregarding it was not reasonable diligence under due process.
- Voicemails and texts left at a valid phone number did not satisfy section 316.2’s required advisements about possible termination of parental rights or supply the JV-505 form.
- The Chapman standard applies to notice violations in dependency cases; the department bears the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt and failed to meet it here.
- Biological fatherhood alone does not confer presumed father status; the father must prove a fully developed parental relationship under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).
- Vacatur of the termination order extended to the mother as well, because the juvenile court lacked authority to terminate parental rights solely as to her.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision reinforces that social services agencies must pursue case-specific leads—such as pending criminal cases in the same jurisdiction—when searching for a missing alleged father, and that the Chapman standard places a heavy burden on the state to prove a notice violation harmless. It also confirms that biological parentage does not by itself create presumed status, and that defective notice can unwind termination orders and delay permanency for children.