Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ian Patrick Scarborough was convicted of first degree murder with an enhancement for personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, and was sentenced to 25 years to life plus one year. The charge stemmed from the October 17, 2022 fatal stabbing of Billy Carrow in the neck at a homeless encampment in Fresno. Eyewitnesses, including one who had since entered a witness protection program, identified Scarborough as the murderer, and his backpack was found at the crime scene. Scarborough denied involvement in the killing.
Jury deliberations began on Wednesday, May 8, 2024, and continued over five nonconsecutive days. On May 10, the jury submitted Jury Request No. 3, which stated, 'Our final decision is not unanimous.' The trial court responded by reiterating that the verdict on each charge must be unanimous, reading CALCRIM No. 3551 on continued deliberations, asking the foreperson whether additional time would allow a unanimous verdict (the foreperson answered no), and sending the jury back to deliberate.
On May 13, the jury submitted further questions, including one asking for a numerical definition of reasonable doubt and another about how drug use relates to intent. While formulating a response to the latter, the court asked the foreperson whether there had been any movement in the jury's numerical division; the foreperson reported the split had moved from 9-3 the previous Friday to 11-1. The court remarked, 'Okay. So there's been some movement,' confirmed the jury had reviewed CALCRIM No. 3551, and encouraged the jurors to 'keep working at it.' The jury returned a guilty verdict the following morning.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected Scarborough's claim that the response to Jury Request No. 3 coerced the verdict by excluding the possibility of a hung jury. Reiterating the unanimity requirement correctly stated the law, and because the court paired that discussion with CALCRIM No. 3551—which tells jurors not to surrender their individual judgment or change their position merely to reach a verdict—there was no reasonable probability the jury construed the instructions as a mandate to convict.
The court distinguished People v. Hinton, where an improper Allen-type instruction told jurors the case must be decided, emphasized the expense of retrial, and urged minority jurors to respect the majority. Here the trial court made none of those remarks, and CALCRIM No. 3551 adequately conveyed that jurors need not reach a verdict and should not acquiesce in one they disagree with.
The court also held that inquiring into the numerical division and remarking that there had been 'some movement' were not coercive: the judge directed the foreperson not to reveal which side the votes favored, and California has rejected the federal per se rule of Jiminez v. Myers that such inquiries are inherently coercive. Finally, telling the jury to 'continue deliberating' and 'keep working at it' while the court prepared a response to a pending jury request was not coercive, especially since the court had just confirmed the jury had CALCRIM No. 3551.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court does not coerce a verdict by responding to a jury's statement that its decision is not unanimous with a correct unanimity instruction paired with CALCRIM No. 3551.
- CALCRIM No. 3551's admonition that jurors should not surrender their individual judgment merely to reach a verdict sufficiently conveys that a hung jury is an acceptable outcome.
- Inquiring into the jury's numerical division without asking which side the votes favor is not inherently coercive under California law, which rejects the federal rule to the contrary.
- A neutral remark that there has been 'some movement' in the jury's split, without approval or direction to reconsider, is not an improper Allen-type charge.
- Encouraging jurors to continue deliberating while the court formulates a response to a pending jury question is not coercive when the jury has received CALCRIM No. 3551.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the line between permissible judicial management of deliberations and improper coercion. Trial courts may respond to deadlock notes by restating the unanimity requirement and giving pattern deliberation instructions without drifting into Allen-charge territory, and California continues to reject a per se bar on numerical-division inquiries so long as the court does not learn which side holds the majority or approve movement toward a verdict.
For practitioners, the case shows that context controls coercion claims: the court examined the entire sequence of instructions, emphasizing that CALCRIM No. 3551's recognition that unanimity may be impracticable neutralizes any implication that a verdict is mandatory, and that scheduling remarks tied to a pending jury response will not support a coercion claim absent added pressure or singling out of minority jurors.