Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In January 2024, the Lake County district attorney charged Tasha Lorraine Cattani with receiving stolen property. Trial was repeatedly continued, in part to await the transfer of her codefendant from another county's custody, and was ultimately set to begin on May 29, 2025.
On May 23, 2025, six days before trial, Cattani's attorney filed a petition for mental health diversion and sought to continue the trial to litigate the petition. On May 29, the trial court denied the continuance, noting it was made on the eve of trial and finding counsel had failed to act with due diligence in requesting diversion. The court also denied the diversion petition as untimely because it was filed fewer than ten days before trial.
The same day, Cattani pled no contest to the charge in exchange for a sentence of two years of probation. On appeal, she argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying the requested continuance.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reviewed the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion and accepted the Attorney General's concession that the trial court erred. The court relied on People v. Seigler (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 596, which reversed a denial of a continuance where counsel filed a diversion petition and continuance request on the day trial was to start, reasoning that the potentially enormous benefits of a continuance outweighed any burden.
The court found Seigler's reasoning applied with at least equal force here: Cattani sought a continuance six days before trial, the request was unopposed, the record indicated her mental health was an issue, and there was evidence explaining why counsel did not file a diversion petition earlier. On this record, the court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the requested continuance.
Because it reversed on the continuance issue, the court did not address whether the trial court also abused its discretion by denying the diversion petition itself. It noted, however, that the parties agree a mental health diversion petition is timely so long as it is made before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first, citing People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with directions that Cattani be given a reasonable opportunity to file a diversion application and have it considered on its merits.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies an unopposed request to continue trial made six days before trial so the defense can litigate a mental health diversion petition, at least where the record shows mental health is an issue and explains counsel's timing.
- The potentially enormous benefits of a continuance to pursue mental health diversion can outweigh any burden that granting the continuance would cause.
- A mental health diversion petition is timely if made before jeopardy attaches at trial or before entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first.
- The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with directions that Cattani be given a reasonable opportunity to apply for mental health diversion and to have any application considered on its merits.
- If diversion is granted and successfully completed, the trial court must dismiss the charge under Penal Code section 1001.36; if Cattani does not seek diversion or her application is denied, the judgment will be reinstated.
Why It Matters
The decision extends the reasoning of People v. Seigler to a continuance requested six days before trial rather than on the day of trial, reinforcing that eve-of-trial timing and a lack-of-diligence finding do not automatically justify denying a continuance to pursue mental health diversion when the record supports the defendant's mental health needs and the request is unopposed.
The remand structure preserves the possibility of diversion and dismissal under Penal Code section 1001.36 while allowing reinstatement of the judgment if diversion is not sought or not granted, and the court expressly left open whether the denial of the diversion petition itself was also an abuse of discretion.