Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Thavary Ife Cade sought a domestic violence restraining order against her father, Alphonso Cade, describing threats, stalking, harassment, and prior strangulation. After a February 26, 2024 hearing at which Thavary testified and Alphonso did not appear, the family court issued a five-year order protecting Thavary, her mother Mao Lim, and three siblings. The order barred contact and imposed stay-away requirements. Alphonso did not appeal that order.
In April 2025, Alphonso asked the court to permit peaceful or incidental contact with Thavary, allow specified greetings and emergency communications, and remove the other protected family members from the order. He attributed his absence from the original hearing to unforeseen circumstances and lack of legal assistance, disputed Thavary’s allegations, and submitted declarations from his adult twin sons. Thavary opposed the request, reporting a voicemail after service of the order, an appearance at her workplace, and further attempts to learn where she lived.
At the May 12, 2025 hearing, both parties appeared without lawyers. Thavary said she remained afraid and wanted no contact, while Alphonso maintained that his workplace inquiries arose from concern and denied threatening anyone. The family court characterized his request as an attempt to relitigate whether the original order was justified and denied modification. Alphonso timely appealed; Thavary did not appear in the Court of Appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It explained that Family Code section 6345 permits termination or modification of a domestic violence restraining order but does not supply the governing decision standard. Following Loeffler v. Medina, the court treated the DVRO as an injunction and applied Code of Civil Procedure section 533, which requires a material change in the supporting facts, a change in the governing law, or a showing that the ends of justice favor modification or dissolution. Denial of such a request is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.
The court first held that Alphonso forfeited his appellate contentions. His opening brief asserted that he was nonviolent, had not behaved threateningly, and had shown harm to his children from separation, but it supplied no record citations for those factual claims. Although he listed seven legal arguments with case names and citations, he provided no supporting legal analysis. Under the appellant’s burden to demonstrate reversible error through an adequate record, record citations, and reasoned argument supported by authority, those submissions were insufficient.
The court nevertheless addressed the merits and found no abuse of discretion. Thavary’s response and hearing testimony described conduct after the DVRO issued and explained her continuing fear and belief that abuse would resume if contact were allowed. Alphonso, by contrast, offered no evidence that he had changed his behavior. His declaration and his sons’ declarations principally denied the earlier abuse and challenged Thavary’s allegations. That approach sought to reopen the original determination rather than establish a material change in facts or law, or another section 533 ground for altering the injunction.
Key Takeaways
- A request to modify or terminate a DVRO is evaluated under the injunction standards of Code of Civil Procedure section 533, as applied through Loeffler v. Medina.
- Denying the original allegations is not the same as presenting evidence of changed behavior or another material change supporting modification.
- The appellate court independently found forfeiture because the opening brief lacked record citations and reasoned legal analysis.
- The court reached the merits despite forfeiture and upheld the family court’s assessment under abuse-of-discretion review.
- The May 12, 2025 order was affirmed, and Alphonso Cade was ordered to bear his own costs on appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinction between collaterally disputing the basis for an existing DVRO and carrying the statutory burden to justify changing it. Evidence bearing on post-order conduct and the protected person’s stated fear supported leaving the order intact, while declarations denying past abuse did not demonstrate changed circumstances.
The opinion also reinforces two practical appellate requirements: factual assertions need record citations, and listed authorities do not substitute for legal analysis. The family court additionally observed that visitation was not at issue in the modification hearing and identified possible separate proceedings concerning separation, divorce, parentage, and visitation; the appellate disposition did not decide those matters.