Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Troy Alexander Moulton drove a black Toyota Camry through a stop-signed residential intersection in San Jose without stopping and struck Barrett Grabow, a Santa Clara University law student walking in a crosswalk. Witnesses estimated speeds of 55 to 70 miles per hour during or immediately after impact, while the prosecution's biomechanics expert placed the impact at least in the 40-to-50-mile-per-hour range and probably closer to 50-plus. Grabow's head and upper body became embedded in the windshield. The Camry left without stopping, and a witness described swerving that appeared intended to dislodge the body. Responders later found Grabow seriously injured on a sidewalk; he died at the hospital from blunt force injuries.
The next morning, Moulton told the Camry's registered owner that he had wrecked the car. They moved it and covered its smashed windshield, prompting a witness to call 911. Moulton subsequently acknowledged hitting a person and surrendered to police the afternoon after the collision. An amended information charged murder, vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence and associated enhancements, and misdemeanor unlicensed driving. The jury convicted on all counts and found the count-two allegations true. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 15 years to life. On appeal, Moulton challenged the implied malice instruction, his counsel's response to a deliberation question, and the asserted cumulative effect of those errors.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that the version of CALCRIM No. 520 used at trial correctly stated implied malice. It required an intentional act whose natural and probable consequences were dangerous to human life, knowledge that the act was dangerous, and deliberate action with conscious disregard for life. Relying on Nieto Benitez and Knoller, the court explained that the objective 'dangerous to life' formulation and the 'high degree of probability' of death formulation embody the same standard. It also rejected the proposed requirement that Moulton subjectively know his conduct carried a high probability of death; Knoller instead requires awareness of conduct endangering another's life.
People v. Reyes did not change that instructional rule. The Sixth District emphasized that Reyes concerned substantial evidence at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, not jury instructions, and reaffirmed rather than displaced the earlier formulations. Cravens likewise addressed evidentiary sufficiency, while the separate writings Moulton invoked were not controlling. The court therefore agreed with Pierce that the former instruction remained correct despite Reyes and the Judicial Council's later revision. Although Moulton had not objected, the court reached the issue because the Attorney General did not assert forfeiture and Moulton alternatively raised ineffective assistance.
The court next assumed, without deciding, that defense counsel performed deficiently after the jury asked what 'act' meant. The trial court had correctly identified intentionally driving in a manner dangerous to human life as the relevant act, but counsel argued for a conscious act with intended consequences and gave an inconsistent pedestrian example. Any deficiency was not prejudicial: the court sustained an objection, directed jurors to follow its instructions, and had already supplied the correct legal answer. The supplemental arguments were brief, counsel's earlier closing was unchallenged, and the implied malice evidence was strong. With only presumed error on one issue and no prejudice, cumulative error also failed. The judgment was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- The former CALCRIM No. 520 remained a correct statement of implied malice despite Reyes and the instruction's later modification.
- Reyes addressed evidentiary sufficiency in a resentencing proceeding and did not impose a new jury-instruction requirement or disapprove Nieto Benitez and Knoller.
- The subjective component requires awareness that one's conduct endangers another's life, not awareness of a high probability that death will result.
- Even assumed deficient defense argument after a jury question did not establish prejudice where the court gave the correct answer, sustained an objection, and directed jurors to follow its instructions.
- The cumulative error doctrine could not supply reversal because the court presumed error on only one issue and found no prejudice.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision applies the Fifth District's Pierce analysis to a fatal pedestrian collision and distinguishes clarification of the implied malice standard from a change in required jury instructions. Its holding rests on controlling California Supreme Court decisions treating the Thomas and Phillips formulations as equivalent, rather than on the later wording of CALCRIM No. 520 alone.
The ineffective assistance analysis also separates deficient performance from prejudice. The court did not need to decide whether counsel's argument fell below professional standards because the correct judicial response, corrective ruling, limited supplemental arguments, and strong evidence independently defeated the claim. The opinion supplies no separate concurrence or dissent and leaves no identified issue unresolved.