Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Stepsisters Janeen Martin and Linda Schmidt inherited joint interests in their parents' Escondido house through the Ford Living Trust. After the probate court ordered the property sold in a partition action, Martin sued Schmidt in August 2024, alleging intentional tort and fraud. Martin claimed that beginning around March 2022 Schmidt falsely represented her intent to purchase the Family Trust's half-interest in the property and her willingness to cooperate with the sale, and that Schmidt's obstructive conduct delayed the sale and caused a $400,000 loss in value so that Schmidt could secure the property for herself or her family at a lower price.
Schmidt responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing that both causes of action arose from her protected litigation activity in the probate proceedings and were barred by the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2) litigation privilege, and she sought attorney fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c). The trial court characterized the gravamen of both causes of action as breach of fiduciary duty based on the parties' co-ownership of the property. Although the court found that both causes of action probably arose from protected activity sufficient to satisfy Schmidt's prong one burden, it declined to reach the merits of prong one because it denied the motion under prong two, finding that Martin had established a probability of prevailing on her claims. Schmidt timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed, reviewing the denial de novo. On prong one, the court held that both causes of action arise from protected activity. Schmidt's alleged misrepresentations about her intent to purchase the property were made in anticipation of the partition litigation, and her later statements about cooperating with the sale were made while the Partition Petition was pending in probate court. Her refusal to sign listing agreements and related delay-causing acts were statements made before the court and assertions of her position as respondent in that litigation, protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2). Martin's attempt to classify the conduct as noncommunicative was unpersuasive, and her factual contentions unsupported by proper record citations were disregarded.
On prong two, the court held that the litigation privilege bars Martin's claims. The injury-producing acts in both causes of action were communicative acts connected to the Partition Petition — misrepresentations regarding purchasing the property and cooperating with its sale, requests for continuances, and arguments in the probate court. Because the gravamen of the action was communicative rather than an independent noncommunicative wrongful act, Martin could not carry her burden of showing a probability of prevailing, and the trial court should have granted the motion.
The disposition reverses the order. On remand, the trial court shall enter an order striking Martin's complaint and shall address Schmidt's request for attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c). Schmidt is awarded costs on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- The anti-SLAPP statute protects statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding, including alleged misrepresentations about intent to purchase property and willingness to cooperate with a court-ordered sale.
- Conduct such as declining to sign listing agreements, when it amounts to asserting a party's position in pending litigation, qualifies as protected petitioning activity under section 425.16.
- The litigation privilege bars tort claims, including fraud, whose gravamen is communicative acts connected to litigation, even if those communications are alleged to be fraudulent.
- A trial court's denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo on appeal.
- On remand the trial court must strike the complaint and address the movant's attorney fee request under section 425.16(c), and the prevailing appellant is awarded costs on appeal.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision applies the anti-SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege in the probate and partition context, confirming that claims premised on a party's alleged misrepresentations and litigation conduct in a judicial proceeding arise from protected activity and are barred at prong two. It illustrates that the litigation privilege immunizes communicative acts connected to litigation from tort liability, including fraud claims, absent an independent noncommunicative wrongful act as the gravamen.
The decision also underscores that appellate courts will disregard factual contentions not supported by proper citations to the record, a recurring pitfall in anti-SLAPP appeals.