Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michele Uriarte and Gyorgy Matrai were parties to a marital dissolution action pending in Contra Costa County Superior Court since May 2019. Matrai represented himself in this appeal from the trial court’s May 22, 2023 order granting Uriarte’s request for a charging order under Corporations Code section 17705.03(a). Uriarte did not file a respondent’s brief or other appellate documents, so the Court of Appeal decided the matter on Matrai’s opening brief and the record he supplied under California Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).
Uriarte filed her charging-order request on March 13, 2023, seeking an order directing Goodwood Properties, LLC to pay her distributions otherwise payable to Matrai. Her declaration stated that he owed more than $1 million in unpaid child and spousal support, attorney fees, and sanctions under final orders entered between October 2019 and September 2022. She also stated that Matrai had refused to pay court-ordered amounts and that the LLC was the only asset the court had been able to attach, making recovery unlikely without the charging order. A hearing was noticed for May 22, 2023, and the request was granted following that hearing.
Matrai argued that the family court lacked jurisdiction to issue a charging order, that Uriarte had not substantiated her request, and that he received no notice of the May 22 hearing. The hearing was unreported, and Matrai did not provide a settled statement. The appellate court also denied his September 6, 2023 request for judicial notice because he did not demonstrate the relevance of the submitted documents to the appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the jurisdictional challenge because Matrai cited no authority establishing that charging orders cannot enforce family-court judgments or orders. It explained that Family Code section 290 permits enforcement by execution, receivership, contempt, or other necessary orders. Code of Civil Procedure sections 680.230 and 708.310, together with Corporations Code section 17705.03(a), authorize charging a judgment debtor’s LLC interest. The court also cited Baum v. Baum as approving a charging order in a divorce proceeding to enforce a judgment against a spouse’s partnership interest.
The notice argument was forfeited on the record presented. Although Matrai asserted that he lacked notice, the register of actions showed that a proof of service was filed on the same day as Uriarte’s charging-order request, but that document was omitted from the clerk’s transcript. The court applied its earlier warning in a related appeal that an appellant must demonstrate reversible error through an adequate record, and it noted Matrai’s repeated failure to support appellate arguments with record citations and legal authority.
The court likewise rejected the claim that the request was unsubstantiated. Matrai’s opening brief did not summarize the significant record facts as rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) requires or set forth all material evidence needed for a substantial-evidence challenge. Independently, Uriarte’s declaration was sufficient to support the charging order under the substantial-evidence standard described in Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, LLP v. Fotouhi. The enforceability and amounts of the underlying unsatisfied orders were not properly before the court, and Matrai’s remaining conclusory assertions established no error. The order was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Family-court judgments and orders may be enforced through a charging order against a debtor’s transferable interest in a limited liability company.
- An appellant challenging notice must provide an adequate record, particularly when the register of actions identifies a proof of service omitted from the appellate transcripts.
- A substantial-evidence challenge requires a compliant factual summary and presentation of all material evidence, not merely the appellant’s preferred evidence.
- Uriarte’s declaration independently supplied sufficient support for the charging order despite the deficiencies in Matrai’s opening brief.
- The appellate court did not decide whether the underlying support, fee, and sanction orders were enforceable or whether their stated amounts were correct.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established enforcement statutes to a family-law collection dispute and confirms that the family court’s broad enforcement authority can reach LLC distributions through a statutory charging order. It does not create a new exception to the statutory requirements; rather, it explains how Family Code section 290 and the civil enforcement provisions work together.
The affirmance also turns heavily on appellate procedure. Matrai’s lack of legal authority, missing record documents, noncompliant factual presentation, and conclusory assertions prevented meaningful review of several challenges. The opinion therefore underscores that self-represented appellants must still supply record citations, relevant authority, and the documents necessary to demonstrate reversible error.