Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
K.G. was accused of a January 2020 shooting at a Delano park that killed a 19-year-old woman and wounded her boyfriend. A confidential informant told police K.G. admitted being the shooter, and K.G. later implicated himself to undercover agents placed in a recorded cell and then to a detective, though he claimed self-defense. A juvenile wardship petition filed March 9, 2022 alleged five counts: first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and possession of a stolen vehicle. The petition also alleged firearm-use and gang-affiliation enhancements, and alleged the murder occurred while K.G. was an active participant in a criminal street gang, making the murder count death-penalty eligible under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). The prosecution moved the same day to transfer the case to criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 707.
What followed was roughly three years of continuances, almost all at the defense's request. K.G.'s initial counsel was leaving practice on July 19, 2023, and new counsel substituted into the case on July 25, 2023, requiring the new attorney to review discovery from scratch. Efforts to secure an expert consumed more time: the first court-appointed expert responded slowly, the second refused the appointment, and a third expert retained by the defense needed months to complete an evaluation. The People requested continuances only twice, on April 19, 2023 and December 4, 2023, and began objecting to all further continuances beginning in April 2024. The transfer hearing was held on April 1, 2025; the trial court accepted the probation officer's report as evidence, took judicial notice of other pending cases against K.G., and no testimony was presented. On April 15, 2025, the Kern County Superior Court found by clear and convincing evidence that K.G. was not amenable to rehabilitation, citing the crime's sophistication, his lengthy juvenile history, and the gravity of the offense, and issued the transfer order.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, resolving the appeal largely on waiver and forfeiture grounds. Assuming without deciding that constitutional speedy-trial protections attach to a section 707 transfer motion, the court held K.G. waived any such claim: counsel expressly waived time on 21 separate occasions, often in response to direct questioning by the trial court, and impliedly waived time on the remaining occasions by requesting continuances or agreeing to specific dates. The court rejected K.G.'s reliance on Townsend v. Superior Court, noting that case bars waiver only over the client's objection, and the record showed no objection by K.G., who was present at the vast majority of hearings. As to his statutory claims, the court concluded K.G. implicitly waived the written-motion argument by making only oral requests for continuances, and forfeited both the written-motion and good-cause arguments by raising neither below.
The court also held K.G. waived his right to be personally present at the six brief status hearings he missed, because counsel affirmatively waived his appearance each time and agency principles permit counsel to waive presence at brief procedural hearings. His claim that he lacked sufficient resources to litigate amenability was forfeited, and the court declined to excuse the forfeiture because the case did not present an especially important legal issue warranting resolution; the record showed the delays stemmed from personal choices largely made by K.G. and his team rather than systemic resource failures. Finally, the court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington: the record did not contain affirmative evidence that there were no rational tactical reasons for each continuance, and there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome given the trial court's comment that the transfer decision was 'not a very close one.'
Key Takeaways
- Express time waivers entered by counsel on the record, repeated across 21 hearings, will defeat a speedy-trial claim on appeal even assuming the right attaches to a juvenile transfer proceeding.
- A defendant who never objects to continuances while present in court cannot later invoke Townsend's rule against waiver over a client's objection.
- Counsel may validly waive a minor's personal appearance at brief procedural hearings, and the minor's presence at other hearings without objection undercuts any claim of involuntary absence.
- Claims that the defense lacked adequate resources must be raised in the trial court or they are forfeited, and appellate courts will rarely excuse that forfeiture.
- Ineffective-assistance claims premised on counsel's continuance requests face steep odds on direct appeal where each continuance had a stated, reasonable purpose and the record shows no prejudice.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that waiver and forfeiture doctrines apply with full force in juvenile transfer proceedings, and that a minor who benefits from delays to prepare an amenability defense cannot later attack those same delays on appeal. It also illustrates the practical difficulty of mounting Strickland challenges to continuance strategy on direct appeal, particularly where the trial court's transfer findings were emphatic and the defense used the extra time to retain an expert and explore a plea.