Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
San Bernardino County Children and Family Services received a referral in August 2025 alleging that 16-year-old B.A. had been sexually abused by her adult half-sister’s husband, Fernando H. B.A. described repeated sexual contact and digital penetration. She also reported that her mother, L.A., blamed her for the disclosures, discouraged reporting, isolated her, and withheld insulin. The agency filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother knew or should have known of the abuse and failed to protect B.A., that Mother’s conduct caused serious emotional damage, and that Father also failed to protect the child. The juvenile court initially detained B.A. from both parents and ordered supervised visits.
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings in January 2026, B.A. and Mother testified. The juvenile court found B.A. completely credible, dismissed the sexual-abuse failure-to-protect allegation concerning Father, and sustained the remaining allegations. It declared B.A. a dependent, removed her from Mother’s custody, and placed her with Father under family maintenance services. The court found substantial danger in Mother’s home and no reasonable means of protection short of removal. It found reunification services unavailable under section 16507, subdivision (b), because B.A. was placed with Father, a previously custodial parent, and it did not order discretionary services to Mother. The court also did not order visitation. Mother appealed the removal, services, and visitation rulings.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal upheld removal under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Reviewing the underlying findings for substantial evidence while accounting for the clear-and-convincing standard, the court pointed to evidence that Mother witnessed inappropriate touching, failed to intervene, warned B.A. about Fernando’s behavior, and did not question the child after seeing her crying following the pool incident. The court could reasonably infer that Mother knew or should have known of the abuse. Her accusations that B.A. lied, limited insight, continued relationship with Fernando, and failure to protect B.A. supported the conclusion that she would remain insufficiently protective.
The evidence also supported the finding that no reasonable alternative to removal would protect B.A. Mother had not returned forms needed for service referrals, had resisted answering pertinent questions, and had not addressed B.A.’s substantial trust concerns. The juvenile court was not required to list every alternative it considered and rejected. Given Mother’s conduct and lack of engagement, the appellate court concluded that protective orders, contact restrictions, or in-home supervision could reasonably be found inadequate.
The court rejected Mother’s claim that services were improperly bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Because B.A. was placed with Father, a previously custodial parent, section 16507, subdivision (b), made reunification services unavailable; Mother instead could receive discretionary enhancement services. The juvenile court had expressly recognized that the bypass provision was inapplicable and struck those proposed findings. Its additional comments about severe sexual abuse did not establish reversible error, and Mother showed neither prejudice nor an abuse of discretion in the denial of discretionary services. Finally, section 362.1 did not require a detriment finding because B.A. was neither placed in foster care nor provided reunification services. Visitation was discretionary under section 361.2, the detriment finding was unnecessary, and Mother did not argue that not ordering visitation abused the court’s discretion. The dispositional order was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s clear-and-convincing findings that B.A. faced substantial danger in Mother’s home and could not reasonably be protected without removal.
- A juvenile court need not expressly identify every less restrictive alternative it considered before ordering removal.
- When a child is placed with one previously custodial parent, the other parent is not entitled to reunification services under section 16507, subdivision (b), although the court may order discretionary enhancement services.
- Comments concerning an inapplicable reunification-bypass provision did not establish reversible error where services were correctly unavailable under section 16507 and Mother showed no prejudice.
- Section 362.1’s visitation framework did not apply because B.A. was not in foster care and reunification services were not ordered, leaving visitation to the juvenile court’s discretion under section 361.2.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes the statutory treatment of reunification services from discretionary enhancement services when a dependent child remains with a previously custodial parent. It also explains why the foster-care visitation provision did not govern this placement and why an unnecessary detriment finding did not undermine the visitation ruling.
The unpublished opinion may not be cited or relied upon except as permitted by California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b). The appellate court noted that section 361, subdivision (c)(4), arguably supplied an alternative removal basis, but it did not decide that issue because the juvenile court expressly relied only on subdivision (c)(1).