Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In this Eastern District of California case, plaintiff Stacie Miller sued individually and as successor in interest to the Estate of Vinton Miller against Placer County and other defendants, including Dr. Evan Matshes and Naag Forensics PC. On August 22, 2025, the court entered an order dismissing "all claims" against Dr. Matshes and Naag Forensics PC "with prejudice" (Docket No. 48). The dismissal occurred because plaintiff agreed to dismissal at oral argument, and the order gave no reason for making that dismissal with prejudice.
Plaintiff later moved to revise those dismissals so they would be without prejudice (Docket No. 89). The court treated the request as one to revisit an interlocutory order: under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a court may revise "any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties" at any time before entry of final judgment. Because the August 22, 2025 order did not enter final judgment, the court concluded it could revise the dismissal for sufficient cause, citing Ferguson v. GreenSky, Inc. and City of L.A., Harbor Division v. Santa Monica Baykeeper. The order is dated October 29, 2026 and was filed October 30, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the motion and amended its prior order. It explained that it had used the term "with prejudice" inadvertently: its intention was to deny plaintiff leave to amend these claims in the federal action, not to preclude her from refiling them in state court. That mismatch between the order's wording and the court's actual intention supplied sufficient cause for revision.
The court also relied on the ordinary presumptions surrounding voluntary and non-merits dismissals. Under Rule 41(a)(2), dismissals at the plaintiff's request are ordinarily without prejudice "[u]nless the order states otherwise," and non-merits dismissals are typically without prejudice as well, citing Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris. Neither the court's remarks nor plaintiff's concession at oral argument indicated that dismissal would be on the merits; indeed, plaintiff agreed to dismissal while noting she was considering filing these claims in state court, an option that dismissal with prejudice would foreclose. Amending the order would therefore conform the disposition to the court's intentions.
The court therefore ordered that plaintiff's motion to revise be granted, that the August 22, 2025 order be amended to dismiss without prejudice plaintiff's claims against Dr. Evan Matshes and Naag Forensics PC, and that the January 19, 2027 hearing be vacated.
Key Takeaways
- A district court may revise an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b) at any time before final judgment when there is sufficient cause.
- The court held that it had inadvertently labeled the dismissals "with prejudice" when it meant only to deny leave to amend in the federal case, not to bar refiling in state court.
- Dismissals at a plaintiff's request are ordinarily without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) unless the order states otherwise, and non-merits dismissals are typically without prejudice.
- Because plaintiff agreed to dismissal while preserving the possibility of refiling in state court, the court amended the order to dismiss the claims against Dr. Matshes and Naag Forensics PC without prejudice.
- The court also vacated the January 19, 2027 hearing after granting the motion to revise.
Why It Matters
This order is a practical reminder that the wording of a dismissal can have consequences beyond the court's intended ruling, especially when a party may want to pursue claims in another forum. It shows how Rule 54(b) can be used to correct an interlocutory disposition so that it matches the court's actual intent before judgment becomes final.
For litigants, the decision underscores the difference between denying leave to amend in the current action and precluding refiling elsewhere. Where the record does not show a merits-based dismissal, courts may be willing to revise a "with prejudice" label that would otherwise foreclose a state-court filing, and the ruling illustrates the interaction between Rule 54(b) and Rule 41(a)(2).