Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A Madera County jury convicted Otis McKinzy, Jr. of carjacking, kidnapping with intent to commit rape, forcible oral copulation, and sodomy by force. It also found true kidnapping allegations associated with the sexual offenses and, in a bifurcated proceeding, three prior convictions, all dated January 28, 1998, for violations of sections 207(a)/208(d), 261(a)(2), and former section 288a(c), arising from Madera Superior Court case No. 14175. The trial court imposed an aggregate indeterminate term of 225 years to life, plus a 14-year determinate term comprised of five years for a section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement and nine years for a section 667.8, subdivision (a) enhancement, while staying the sentence on the carjacking count under section 654. The five-year terms for the two other section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancements were also ordered stayed pursuant to section 654.
Near the end of the guilt trial, McKinzy physically attacked his defense attorney in the courtroom and was restrained and removed. Jail and transportation officers subsequently reported that he refused to return to court and continued making threatening statements. Counsel said he could still represent McKinzy effectively, but agreed that McKinzy's aggression had escalated. The court found that McKinzy had forfeited his right to be present at the trial and proceeded without him. It directed the jury not to consider what happened the prior day and McKinzy's actions in reaching a verdict.
McKinzy raised two appellate challenges. First, he argued that the initial removal order could not automatically extend to the later bifurcated prior-conviction trial without a renewed, stage-specific inquiry, and that his absence prevented him from waiving a jury on those allegations. Second, he contended that counsel's closing argument effectively conceded carjacking and kidnapping without valid personal authorization, violating the Sixth Amendment principle recognized in McCoy v. Louisiana.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal held that the record supported the trial court's determination that McKinzy would remain disruptive and dangerous during the bifurcated proceeding. It emphasized the severity of the attack, the continuing threats, McKinzy's refusal to attend, and counsel's account of escalating aggression. The court also could not conclude the trial court had a duty to inquire again on December 17, 2024, explaining that a court need not repeatedly offer a dangerous defendant opportunities to injure others after reasonably concluding that he cannot be trusted to behave.
The court additionally found no evidence that McKinzy had reclaimed his right to attend by requesting readmission and expressing a willingness to follow courtroom decorum. Any claim based on the absence of closed-circuit participation was forfeited because he had not requested it, and no statute or rule required such a feed. The bifurcated jury trial also complied with section 1025; McKinzy supplied no authority establishing an unconditional right to waive a jury on the prior-conviction allegations.
On the concession issue, the court assumed for analysis that counsel's closing remarks about the carjacking and kidnapping evidence amounted to concessions of guilt. It nevertheless found no Sixth Amendment violation because McKinzy did not show that he opposed that strategy. Defense counsel had stated on the record on December 5, 2024, in McKinzy's presence, that McKinzy provided consent to indicate they were conceding certain counts, and the record contained no intransigent objection comparable to McCoy. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A violent assault on counsel, continuing threats, and refusal to attend court can support exclusion from a later bifurcated proceeding without a renewed inquiry at each stage.
- A removed defendant who seeks to return must reclaim the right to be present by requesting readmission and demonstrating a willingness to behave appropriately.
- Section 1025 provided McKinzy with a jury trial on the prior-conviction allegations, and he identified no unconditional right to waive that jury while absent.
- McCoy's structural-error rule applies when counsel concedes guilt over the defendant's clear objection, not merely whenever counsel acknowledges strong prosecution evidence.
- The November 3, 2026 modification deleted 'Dale J. Blea, Judge' and replaced it with 'Ernest J. LiCalsi, Judge,' expressly making no change to the judgment.
Why It Matters
The decision applies California's disruptive-defendant authorities to a bifurcated prior-conviction trial, treating the initial exclusion as sustainable on a record of continuing violence, threats, and noncooperation. It also places practical weight on whether the defendant sought readmission and whether any alternative participation was requested, rather than requiring repeated inquiries or remote-video arrangements on the court's own initiative.
The Sixth Amendment analysis distinguishes an unauthorized concession over a defendant's express objection from a defense strategy that contrasts stronger and weaker portions of the prosecution's case. Even assuming counsel's argument crossed into a concession, the absence of demonstrated opposition was dispositive here. The opinion is unpublished and subject to California's restrictions on citation and reliance.