Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Aaron Jahrootz Steele was convicted of two counts of resisting an executive officer with force or violence, misdemeanor trespass, and three counts of threatening a public officer. The trial court found that counts 5 and 6 occurred while Steele was released on bail or his own recognizance, struck the associated enhancements, and imposed two years of felony probation with conditions including 281 days of custodial confinement. The charges arose from a December 13, 2024 shopping-center encounter and a January 1, 2025 arrest outside a gas station, initially prosecuted in separate cases and later consolidated.
In this original habeas corpus proceeding, Steele alleged violations of the Racial Justice Act of 2020 concerning all counts and ineffective assistance regarding count 6, which was based on his statement that he would elbow Deputy Ethan Hatch. Steele said Officer Jeff Bolton displayed potential racial bias and cited arrest data, while also requesting appointed habeas counsel and discovery. His ineffective-assistance claim concerned trial counsel Jordan Proctor’s failure to seek a pinpoint instruction explaining that Steele’s asserted belief that he was being illegally abducted could negate the specific intent required for threatening a public officer.
The appellate court requested an informal response, which addressed only the Racial Justice Act claim, and Steele filed a reply. It then issued an order to show cause limited to the instructional claim and advised that, absent timely objections, the informal response and reply would serve as the return and traverse. Neither party objected. The court also denied Steele’s request to consolidate this proceeding with his direct appeal, granted judicial notice of the appellate record, and considered the matters together; it stated that a contemporaneous opinion affirmed the judgment in part.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the Racial Justice Act claim without prejudice to refiling in San Diego County Superior Court. It explained that although it has original habeas jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise that jurisdiction when relief was not first sought in superior court, particularly where factual issues may require an evidentiary hearing. Steele had not presented the claim to the trial court and identified no extraordinary circumstances justifying an exception. The ruling did not adjudicate the underlying allegations of officer bias or disparate charging.
On count 6, the court found deficient performance and prejudice. Threatening a public officer under Penal Code section 71 is a specific-intent crime requiring intent to influence an officer’s official duties, so an actual but unreasonable mistake of fact can supply a defense. Steele’s testimony, his repeated demands for a warrant, his statements that his case was absent from courthouse monitors, and body-camera evidence constituted substantial evidence that he subjectively believed the deputies were abducting or illegally detaining him. The trial court therefore would have had to give a legally correct mistake-of-fact instruction if counsel had requested one.
The People’s return did not address ineffective assistance, impliedly admitting the allegation that counsel lacked a tactical reason. An email exchange also showed that Proctor believed mistake of fact was inapplicable under his understanding of the law. The court held that this misunderstanding, rather than an informed tactical choice, fell below professional norms. It found a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted to acquit with proper instruction, emphasizing the jury’s request for clarification of intent. It vacated count 6, permitted retrial within the lawful timeframe, expressed no view on evidentiary sufficiency at retrial, denied all other requested relief, remanded for further proceedings, and directed that the opinion be sent to the State Bar concerning Proctor.
Key Takeaways
- A requested mistake-of-fact instruction was warranted because substantial evidence supported Steele’s actual, even if unreasonable, belief that he was being illegally abducted.
- The omission was deficient because it resulted from counsel’s misunderstanding of the law rather than an informed tactical decision.
- The jury’s question about intent supported a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different verdict with the pinpoint instruction.
- The Racial Justice Act allegations remained unresolved and could be presented first in San Diego County Superior Court.
- Only the count 6 conviction was vacated, and the prosecution retained the option to retry that count within the timeframe allowed by law.
Why It Matters
The decision applies settled ineffective-assistance principles to a specific-intent public-officer threat prosecution and distinguishes an actual mistake of fact from the reasonable mistake required for general-intent crimes. It also shows how an unresponsive habeas return can leave a material allegation about counsel’s lack of tactical justification admitted, while independent review of the evidentiary record still determines whether an instruction was available and prejudice resulted.
The relief was deliberately limited: the court did not decide the Racial Justice Act allegations, disturb the other convictions through this petition, or decide whether evidence would suffice at a retrial of count 6. Its disposition also included the statutory State Bar referral and directions for distribution of the opinion following finality.