Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Edward B. Spencer, a self-represented, vision-impaired inmate at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, alleged that on February 21, 2024, a CDCR information technician deleted a computer file he described as a "Legal Manuscript" and was then unable to retrieve it. Spencer, a certified paralegal, sought recovery of the file or its value. On March 17, 2024, he submitted Grievance No. 535103 under title 15, section 3193, subdivision (b), of the California Code of Regulations, which requires CDCR to accept liability for loss or destruction of inmate personal property caused by employee action.
On March 23, 2024, CDCR's Office of Grievances "redirected" the grievance to appropriate SATF staff while advising Spencer he could appeal to the Office of Appeals if dissatisfied. After 60 days passed without a substantive response, Spencer appealed on May 20, 2024, stating the redirect had not been addressed, and sent follow-up letters in June 2024. He filed his original petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory relief in Kings County Superior Court on September 3, 2024. The trial court sustained demurrers to the original petition and first amended petition with leave to amend, each time for failure to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies.
While the case was pending, Spencer continued pursuing administrative relief; those later grievances were rejected as untimely or denied, and his appeals ended in "Time Expired" decisions. On May 19, 2025, he filed his second amended petition. On July 25, 2025, the trial court sustained CDCR's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the petition, concluding Spencer was required to timely appeal the redirect decision itself and had not shown he should be excused from exhaustion. Spencer timely appealed on August 7, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed with CDCR that Spencer's post-petition grievances could not be considered because exhaustion is jurisdictional and must occur before judicial relief is sought, so the court evaluated only Spencer's pre-petition efforts. The court explained that a "redirected" decision does not itself constitute exhaustion and was not a substantive ruling on the merits; it expressly contemplated further action by SATF staff. Because no regulation identified any process for an inmate who accepted a redirect but never received a substantive decision, Spencer's appeal within 60 days of the redirect—stating that the redirect had not been addressed—was the only logical step available to him.
The court held that if no administrative process exists to obtain timely, substantive redress after a grievance is redirected, the process "operates as a simple dead end" and is unavailable under the first category recognized in Ross v. Blake and discussed in Foster v. Sexton, excusing exhaustion. The court rejected CDCR's argument that unavailability applies only when administrators thwart the process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation, explaining that Foster addressed only that category because it was the theory advanced there. The court also noted that, as a technical matter, Spencer did timely appeal the redirect decision, and the merit of his stated ground for appeal was irrelevant to exhaustion.
Accepting Spencer's allegations as true, as required on demurrer, the court concluded he alleged specific facts showing the administrative process was rendered unavailable and a valid excuse for not pursuing further exhaustion. It reversed the July 25, 2025 dismissal order, directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer, and awarded Spencer his costs on appeal. The court expressly left open whether CDCR actually issued and communicated a substantive decision on the redirected grievance, calling those factual issues not resolvable on demurrer.
Key Takeaways
- A CDCR decision "redirecting" an inmate grievance does not itself exhaust administrative remedies, and if no substantive decision follows, the process may be deemed unavailable.
- The unavailability exception to exhaustion is not limited to machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation; a process that operates as a simple dead end also qualifies.
- Because exhaustion is jurisdictional, grievances filed after a petition is on file cannot cure a pre-filing exhaustion defect.
- On demurrer, a court must accept as true an inmate's allegation that he never received a substantive decision, and whether one was issued or communicated is a factual issue for later proceedings.
- The trial court was directed to overrule the demurrer, reviving Spencer's mandamus claim seeking recovery of his deleted legal manuscript or its value.
Why It Matters
The opinion clarifies how California's exhaustion doctrine applies to CDCR's grievance system when a grievance is redirected and then never substantively answered, confirming that inmates cannot be barred from court by an administrative dead end. It also corrects an overly narrow reading of Foster v. Sexton, making clear that all three Ross v. Blake categories of unavailability remain viable under state law.
Although unpublished and non-citable under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, the decision offers a detailed roadmap for self-represented inmates and practitioners on pleading exhaustion or excuse in mandamus petitions challenging CDCR's handling of property-loss grievances, while leaving the underlying merits of Spencer's claim for the trial court to address on remand.