California Case Summaries

People v. Carl Albert Skidmore — One Strike enhancement based on a pre-enactment conviction does not violate the ex post facto prohibition

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
People v. Carl Albert Skidmore
Court
1st District Court of Appeal
Judge
Burns; Simons; Chou
Date Decided
2026-11-04
Docket No.
A175319
Status
Unreported / Non-Citable
Topics
One Strike Law, ex post facto, recidivist sentencing enhancements, unauthorized sentence, postconviction jurisdiction, habeas corpus, Delgadillo independent review

Background

A January 2008 Sonoma County information charged Carl Albert Skidmore with multiple sexual offenses. For counts IV through IX, it alleged under the One Strike Law that he had a 1985 conviction for committing a lewd act on a child. On January 29, 2008, a jury found him guilty on all counts except counts V and VIII. As to counts V and VIII, the jury found him not guilty, but with respect to count VIII, it convicted him of the lesser included offense of committing a lewd act on a child. The jury found the enhancement allegations true, and the trial court found the prior conviction. Applying Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d), the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 290 years to life in state prison consecutive to 25 years in prison.

On November 17, 2025, defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. He argued that the prior conviction could not support an enhancement because the underlying conduct predated section 667.61’s enactment. After the trial court denied that motion, he appealed. His appellate counsel filed a brief identifying no issues under People v. Delgadillo, and Skidmore then filed a supplemental brief contending that his sentence was unauthorized because it violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal first acknowledged that the courts of appeal are divided over whether a trial court has jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence when a defendant files a resentencing motion after his conviction has become final. It explained that, under one line of decisions, the unauthorized-sentence doctrine excuses forfeiture but does not independently confer jurisdiction; without trial-court jurisdiction, an appellate court may also lack jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a resentencing motion. The court nevertheless, in furtherance of judicial economy, construed his appeal as a habeas petition and reached the merits of his challenge. Because Skidmore had not styled the matter as a habeas petition himself, the court stated that the instant matter shall not count against him for purposes of determining whether any subsequent habeas corpus petition that he may file is a successive petition.

On the merits, the court rejected the ex post facto challenge. Skidmore contended that his sentence was unconstitutional because in 1988, at the time he was convicted of his prior offense, the offense was not yet a basis for enhanced sentencing under the One Strike Law, which was not enacted until 1994. Relying on People v. Jackson and a substantial line of California and United States Supreme Court authority, the court explained that increased punishment for a later offense is attributable to the defendant’s repeat-offender status and arises as an incident of the later crime, rather than as additional punishment for the earlier offense. In 2008, when Skidmore was convicted of the offenses for which he received the challenged sentence, the One Strike Law had already been in effect for years. The court also found his reliance on People v. Garcia misplaced because Garcia did not address an ex post facto question and did not contain the quotation he attributed to it. Treating the appeal as a habeas petition, the court denied the petition.

Key Takeaways

  • A sentencing enhancement may use a conviction based on conduct predating the enhancement statute without violating the ex post facto prohibition when the enhanced punishment attaches to a later offense.
  • Increased penalties for subsequent offenses are attributable to the defendant’s status as a repeat offender and arise as an incident of the subsequent offense rather than constituting a penalty for the prior offense.
  • Uncertainty over postconviction trial-court jurisdiction did not prevent review because the appellate court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a habeas corpus petition.
  • The converted proceeding will not count against Skidmore in deciding whether a future habeas petition is successive because he did not originally designate his appeal as a habeas petition.
  • The court reached the merits despite counsel’s no-issue brief because Skidmore filed a supplemental brief presenting his unauthorized-sentence argument.

Why It Matters

The decision applies settled recidivist-sentencing principles to a One Strike enhancement: no constitutional bar prevents the application of a sentencing enhancement to a current offense solely because the prior conviction which serves as a basis for enhancement was committed before the enhancement provisions became applicable. It also illustrates how an appellate court can address an unauthorized-sentence claim through habeas jurisdiction while acknowledging, without resolving, the appellate split over jurisdiction after a conviction becomes final.

The opinion is not certified for publication and is subject to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. Its express protection concerning successive habeas petitions is specific to the court’s discretionary conversion of Skidmore’s appeal.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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