Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michael D. Marcus appealed from the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s denial of his petition for an administrative writ requiring the Department of Motor Vehicles to reinstate his suspended driver’s license. The process began when a geriatric specialist treating Marcus reported a cognitive impairment and asked the DMV to reevaluate his ability to drive safely. Marcus selected his internist, Dr. Mark Grossman, to complete the driver medical evaluation; Grossman reported mild cognitive impairment, answered that Marcus’s condition currently affected safe driving, advised against driving, and rated memory loss and depression secondary to dementia as moderate impairments.
On November 7, 2023, the DMV imposed a revocation effective November 11 under Vehicle Code section 13953 and sent Marcus an order of suspension. At Marcus’s requested telephonic hearing, DMV employee C. Rubio admitted the suspension order and medical documents; Marcus did not object, offered no documents or other witnesses, and argued Grossman’s evaluation was unreliable and that the DMV retained the burden of proof. Rubio sustained the suspension, explaining that new medical information was needed to overcome Grossman’s advice against driving. A later evaluation from the geriatric specialist was incomplete, and at a January 2024 appointment Marcus refused to proceed with hearing officer Trinidad and refused to reschedule except before an administrative law judge.
In the superior court, Marcus challenged due process and the evidentiary basis for the suspension. He moved to augment the record, filed a motion to compel five categories of discovery, and later augmented the record with a note in which the geriatric specialist said he would have completed the DMV form exactly as Grossman did. The trial court denied the petition after independently finding the weight of the evidence supported the DMV’s findings, rejected the bias claim, and declined to consider declarations outside the administrative record while stating they would not have changed its decision.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected Marcus’s claim that conflicting statutes required a pre-suspension hearing: section 13953 expressly provides an alternative procedure permitting immediate action followed by notice and a requested post-suspension hearing, and neither the statutory scheme nor case law required the DMV’s investigation to take any particular length of time.
The court held Marcus failed to establish that Rubio acted as a DMV advocate or showed actual bias or an unacceptable risk of bias. Rubio introduced routine records and the evaluation by Marcus’s own chosen physician, accepted Marcus’s evidence, allowed unrestricted argument, did not cross-examine him, and did not argue for the DMV; his statements about needing new medical information reflected the DMV’s existing prima facie medical showing, not an unlawful burden shift. The court reached this result even assuming advocacy could serve as a proxy for unconstitutional partiality, an issue pending before the California Supreme Court in Romane and Chi. It also found no due process violation in the later interview because Marcus himself declined further participation and insisted on an ALJ, which neither due process nor the code required.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision: Grossman advised against driving and stated Marcus’s condition affected safe driving, the other physician expressly supported that assessment, and no evidence showed a retraction; appellate review resolved conflicts and credibility determinations in favor of the trial court. The court also upheld the discovery and record rulings: Government Code section 11507.6 does not govern discovery in superior court writ proceedings, the limited Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(e) framework applied, and Marcus showed neither that evidence was improperly excluded nor that it could not have been produced with reasonable diligence. His objections to the record’s certification, the declaration about additional records, and the exclusion of his own declarations likewise failed.
Key Takeaways
- Vehicle Code section 13953 authorized the DMV’s immediate medical-safety suspension followed by notice and a requested post-suspension hearing, with no required minimum investigation time.
- A DMV employee’s service as hearing officer did not itself establish unconstitutional bias, and Marcus did not show the officer acted as an agency advocate.
- The physicians’ evaluations and supporting note were substantial evidence, and the appellate court would not reweigh conflicting evidence or credibility findings.
- Broad agency-adjudication discovery rights under Government Code section 11507.6 do not apply in superior court administrative mandamus proceedings, and Marcus failed the section 1094.5(e) showing for post-hearing discovery.
- The judgment was affirmed and the DMV was awarded its costs on appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established administrative-mandamus and due-process principles to a medically based license suspension while acknowledging an unresolved statewide dispute over when a DMV hearing officer’s relationship with the agency creates an unacceptable risk of bias. The court did not predict the California Supreme Court’s resolution of Romane and Chi; it assumed the advocacy-focused approach Marcus favored and held that Marcus still failed to establish Rubio acted as an advocate.
The ruling also underscores the limited scope of judicial review and discovery in administrative writ proceedings. A challenger must make the statutory showing for additional evidence rather than rely on broad agency-discovery rules, and declarations outside the administrative record will not ordinarily supply a new evidentiary basis for overturning the agency’s decision.