Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Heidi Putallaz received treatment from physical therapist Jesse Young and physical therapy assistant Daniel Deldo at Vargo Physical Therapy. The opinion recounts testimony that, after the treatment relationship deteriorated and the clinic ended her care, Putallaz repeatedly appeared near the therapists' homes, followed Young, and contacted clinic offices and management. Young and Deldo described fear and emotional distress, while Putallaz offered innocent explanations for her presence and accused the respondents of threatening or harassing her. The therapists sought civil harassment restraining orders in June 2022, and the trial court heard five days of testimony from the parties and other witnesses.
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of an unlawful course of harassment that seriously alarmed, annoyed, and harassed the respondents, served no legitimate purpose, and caused significant emotional distress. It imposed three-year orders, including 100-yard stay-away provisions covering homes and workplaces, with an exception allowing Putallaz to attend services and sacraments at her church. The orders expired March 26, 2026. Putallaz later sought the trial judge's disqualification, but the court struck that request as untimely and legally insufficient; her separate restraining-order requests against the respondents were not at issue in this appeal.
Each respondent requested $50,778 in attorney fees and $2,275 in costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. The trial court instead awarded each $25,916.50 in fees and $1,137 in costs, citing delays and redundancies between the related cases. On appeal, Putallaz challenged the restraining orders, the denial of a continuance to obtain sheriff's-station video, and the fee awards. The appellate court also reconsidered an earlier denial and granted her September 19, 2025 motion to augment the record with the fee order and the February 24, 2024 continuance-hearing transcript.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reviewed the restraining-order findings for substantial evidence while treating legal sufficiency and constitutionality as questions subject to de novo review. It held that the evidence supported a continuing pattern of following and stalking directed at both respondents. The court would not reweigh conflicting testimony or revisit credibility: Young denied Putallaz's claims that he repeatedly threatened to kill her, and the respondents disputed her characterization of neighborhood encounters as coincidental. The trial court was not required to accept her explanations or make incident-by-incident findings because the appellate court could infer findings necessary to support the judgment.
The court also found substantial evidence that harassment was likely to recur. Testimony described sightings shortly before the hearing and stalking of Deldo dozens of times over an extended period, supporting an inference that the conditions producing future harm continued. The constitutional challenge failed because the orders imposed defined stay-away restrictions rather than the wholesale disclosure of associational activities at issue in Britt v. Superior Court. The church exception further undercut Putallaz's claim, and she supplied no authority showing that the actual restrictions interfered with protected rights.
The continuance ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court found a lack of diligence because the school allegation had been known for months, the subpoena was sent shortly before the hearing, evidence-exchange deadlines had passed, and the expedited proceeding had already been continued. Unlike the authorities Putallaz cited, she was not deprived of an opportunity to present her case, and the school incident was only one of many. Finally, the fee declaration supplied hourly rates, hours, and general work categories sufficient for a lodestar assessment. The trial court's substantial reductions for delays and duplicated work were reasonable, so the orders and fee awards were affirmed and respondents received costs of appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Appellate courts reviewing California civil harassment restraining orders do not reweigh evidence, redetermine witness credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony.
- A pattern of following or stalking that continues up to the hearing can support the required finding that harassment is likely to recur.
- Section 527.6 does not require separate findings on every alleged incident or express findings on each statutory element when the necessary findings can be inferred.
- A continuance may be denied without an abuse of discretion when the requesting party lacked diligence and the allegedly excluded evidence concerned only one incident in a broader case.
- A fee declaration stating rates, hours, and general categories of work can support a lodestar-based award, particularly when the trial court independently reduces excessive or redundant time.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established California restraining-order and fee principles to a prolonged, sharply disputed evidentiary record. It illustrates how substantial-evidence review preserves credibility-based harassment findings while de novo review still governs whether the proven conduct legally constitutes harassment and whether the resulting restrictions are constitutional.
The opinion also distinguishes a late request for potentially exculpatory video from cases in which denying a continuance effectively prevented a party from presenting any merits case. On fees, it shows that detailed billing entries are not invariably necessary when the declaration permits a lodestar calculation and the trial judge uses familiarity with the proceedings to reduce the request. The opinion is not certified for publication, and California Rule of Court 8.1115 limits its citation and precedential use.