Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Spencer Kaidi filed suit against T-Mobile USA, Inc. in California state court, alleging violations related to privacy tracking. On May 28, 2026, T-Mobile removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California based on federal question jurisdiction. The case was assigned docket number 4:26-cv-05015-AMO.
On October 23, 2026, the district court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court questioned whether Kaidi's operative complaint established a concrete injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. T-Mobile responded to the order on October 29, 2026, arguing that Kaidi had alleged sufficiently concrete injuries.
The Court’s Holding
The district court rejected T-Mobile's arguments and found that Kaidi lacked Article III standing. T-Mobile had contended that Kaidi alleged a concrete injury similar to a privacy invasion actionable at common law, citing Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025). However, the court noted that in Popa, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing because the collected information was not embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private. The court found the same reasoning applied here, concluding that Kaidi did not establish how the tracking of his interactions caused him to experience any kind of harm remotely similar to the highly offensive interferences or disclosures that were actionable at common law.
T-Mobile also suggested that Kaidi alleged a broken promise that might support an injury in fact for California Invasion of Privacy Act claims, relying on Spears v. The Campbell's Soup Co. and Correia v. Lulu & Georgia, Inc. The court distinguished those cases, noting that the plaintiffs in Spears and Correia had a reasonable expectation of privacy because they rejected tracking cookies, yet the defendants nevertheless used tracking technology. In contrast, Kaidi did not allege that he rejected cookies. Instead, he alleged that T-Mobile acted without providing notice or receiving consent, which the court found was not an actionable broken promise.
Accordingly, the court found that Kaidi lacked Article III standing and that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court remanded the case to the Napa County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, which provides that if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. The Clerk of Court was directed to transmit the case and close the file.
Key Takeaways
- Federal courts require plaintiffs to establish Article III standing through allegations of concrete injury, even for statutory privacy claims.
- The Ninth Circuit's decision in Popa v. Microsoft Corp. sets a high bar for privacy-based standing, requiring harm similar to highly offensive common-law privacy invasions.
- Allegations that a defendant acted without notice or consent may not suffice for standing if the plaintiff did not take affirmative steps like rejecting tracking cookies.
- District courts have an independent obligation to verify subject matter jurisdiction and may issue orders to show cause regarding standing deficiencies.
- When a federal court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction after removal, the case must be remanded to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the stringent Article III standing requirements for privacy claims in federal court, particularly following the Ninth Circuit's Popa decision. It demonstrates that merely alleging unauthorized tracking or data collection without more may not establish the concrete injury necessary for federal jurisdiction.
The ruling also highlights the importance of specific factual allegations about a plaintiff's privacy expectations and actions, such as rejecting cookies, in establishing standing for privacy claims. Cases removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction remain subject to remand if the plaintiff cannot satisfy Article III's standing requirements, even when the defendant prefers federal court.