Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Mindaye Sidi-Mahmoud, a native and citizen of Mauritania proceeding without counsel, was paroled into the United States in June 2023 for humanitarian reasons under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). He later applied for asylum and employment authorization. When he appeared at a scheduled immigration court hearing on July 28, 2025, ICE officials detained him. An immigration judge denied his asylum applications and entered an order of removal on September 16, 2025, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal on April 27, 2026. He then filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit, which denied his motion to stay removal on August 13, 2026.
On August 28, 2026, Sidi-Mahmoud filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to appoint counsel. The district judge referred the matter to the assigned magistrate judge for all further proceedings and prohibited the petitioner's transfer out of the district. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on September 9, 2026, and the petitioner filed an opposition on September 18, 2026, completing the briefing.
The Court’s Holding
The court first identified the statutory authority for the detention. It agreed with the petitioner that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b), had been the appropriate detention authority while removal proceedings remained pending, and that he could have raised a viable due process claim during that period. However, by the time he filed the habeas petition, his removal order had become administratively final on April 27, 2026, shifting the detention authority to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The court rejected respondent's contention that the 90-day removal period had been suspended by the petitioner's alleged refusal to board a flight, finding that the petitioner acted within his rights to file the habeas petition and request that ICE await the outcome, and that these actions did not suspend the removal period, which ended on July 26, 2026. Detention after that date was therefore governed by § 1231(a)(6), which permits continued detention of persons found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
On the due process claim, the court applied Zadvydas v. Davis, which recognized a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal-order detention. Although the petitioner had been detained for over six months since his removal order became final, the court found he had not provided a reason to believe there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Ninth Circuit had denied his stay request, the pending petition for review did not affect the finality of the removal order, ICE had obtained a valid travel document and previously arranged removal to Mauritania, and the district court's no-transfer order would not prevent removal once judgment entered. The court therefore concluded the detention remained lawful and recommended granting respondent's motion to dismiss and dismissing the action without prejudice. Separately, the court ordered that the petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel be denied without prejudice, finding the interests of justice did not require appointment.
Key Takeaways
- Detention authority shifts to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 once a removal order becomes administratively final, even if a petition for review remains pending without a stay.
- Filing a habeas petition and asking ICE to postpone removal pending its outcome does not suspend the 90-day removal period under § 1231(a)(1)(C).
- After the presumptively reasonable six-month post-removal-order detention period recognized in Zadvydas v. Davis, a detainee must provide a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to prevail on a due process claim.
- A valid travel document and prior removal arrangements can support a finding that removal remains reasonably foreseeable, defeating a prolonged-detention claim.
- There is no absolute right to appointed counsel in habeas proceedings, and a magistrate judge may deny such a motion where the interests of justice do not require appointment.
Why It Matters
This recommendation illustrates how courts in the Eastern District of California analyze detention challenges brought by noncitizens subject to final removal orders, distinguishing between the detention statutes that apply before and after finality. It underscores that even detention exceeding six months does not automatically violate due process under Zadvydas unless the detainee can show removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
The decision also clarifies that a detainee's pursuit of habeas relief and requests to postpone removal do not extend the government's 90-day removal period, while confirming that such actions alone will not establish that removal is unlikely. The magistrate judge ordered the denial of appointment of counsel without prejudice, while the dismissal recommendation was submitted to the assigned district judge, with objections due within 14 days.