Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Daniel Herrera Luna, a noncitizen in federal immigration detention, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California challenging the lawfulness of his continued detention. A United States Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 16) recommending that the petition be denied, and Luna filed objections (Dkt. 17). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district court conducted a de novo review of the petition, all of the records in the case, the R&R, and the portions of the R&R to which objections were made.
When the R&R was issued, Luna's appeal of the immigration judge's removal order remained pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, so the removal order was not yet administratively final, and the R&R did not rest on the finality ground the district court later applied. By the time the district court ruled, the BIA had dismissed Luna's appeal on September 28, 2026, which made the removal order final under 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a), (c). The court noted that it appears Luna is now detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because his removal order became final on that date.
The Court’s Holding
The court explained that under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Attorney General must effectuate removal within 90 days of a final removal order, and detention is mandatory during that 90-day removal period under § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the removal period expires before the noncitizen is removed, § 1231(a)(6) authorizes continued post-removal-period detention for certain categories of noncitizens, but in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) limits such detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about removal and that six months is a presumptively reasonable period. After six months, a noncitizen is eligible for conditional release by providing good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, at which point the government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.
Because Luna's removal order became final less than 90 days before the ruling — a timing fact the court drew from his Objections at ECF 12-13 — the court held that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2)(A). Relying on Zadvydas and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reasoned that the danger of indefinite civil confinement that animated Zadvydas does not exist during the 90-day removal period, a provision authorizing detention for 90 days only. The court therefore concluded that Luna cannot prevail on his petition or seek immediate release at this time. In its operative directives, the court accepted the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations as set forth in the order, denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, dismissed the above-captioned case without prejudice, and directed that judgment be entered accordingly.
Key Takeaways
- The district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations as set forth in its order, then separately denied Luna's habeas petition and dismissed the case without prejudice.
- Detention during the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A) is mandatory, and the Zadvydas due process analysis does not extend to that window.
- A removal order becomes final when the BIA dismisses the noncitizen's appeal, which starts the 90-day removal clock.
- The dismissal without prejudice leaves Luna free to renew his challenge if detention extends beyond the removal period without a significant likelihood of removal.
- Zadvydas's six-month presumptively reasonable period and its conditional-release framework become relevant only after the mandatory 90-day removal period expires.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the procedural sequencing of post-removal-order detention challenges: a habeas petition filed before or during the 90-day removal period will generally fail because detention during that period is mandatory and not subject to Zadvydas's reasonableness limits. Because the BIA's dismissal made the removal order final less than 90 days before the decision, Luna remained within the mandatory detention window. The dismissal without prejudice preserves his ability to bring a renewed challenge once detention extends beyond the removal period and removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable.