Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
David Emanuel Choc-Choc, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States on May 24, 2019, and was released on an order of recognizance after an encounter with federal immigration officials. Jackson Township Police in New Jersey arrested him on July 24, 2026, for offenses including aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. The order states that the charge remained pending and that the criminal case was in an ongoing early-disposition program. ICE lodged a detainer on July 26 and arrested Choc-Choc on August 3 upon his release from police custody. DHS then charged him as removable under INA §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). He was transferred to the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility, where the order states he remained, and his removal proceedings were ongoing.
Choc-Choc filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a temporary-restraining-order motion on September 25, 2026. He sought immediate release or, alternatively, a substantive bond hearing, arguing that ICE re-detained him without pre-deprivation notice and a hearing in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The government opposed both requests and asserted that the Laken Riley Act required detention because of his recent arrest. After setting a briefing schedule, the court received no request from the government for a hearing or additional briefing and no reply from Choc-Choc. It therefore resolved the habeas petition on the existing record.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that § 1252(g) did not bar review because no removal order was at issue and the central dispute concerned continued detention. It also rejected the government's § 1226(e) argument. The court stated that the Laken Riley Act did not amend that judicial-review provision and relied on Ninth Circuit authority recognizing that § 1226(e) does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law. It therefore retained jurisdiction to review Choc-Choc's due-process claim.
On detention, the court applied the two conditions in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). It found the first satisfied by DHS's removability charges under the specified inadmissibility provisions. It found the second satisfied because Choc-Choc had been arrested and charged under New Jersey law with aggravated assault on a police officer, an offense that on its face fit the statute's enumerated assault-of-a-law-enforcement-officer category. Because the offense fell under the Act and the charges remained pending, the court found mandatory detention applied and that Choc-Choc was not entitled to immediate release or a bond hearing. It contrasted authorities addressing charges that had been dropped or dismissed.
The court denied the habeas petition and denied the TRO motion as moot. It also denied Choc-Choc's motion to appoint counsel, explaining that the interests of justice did not require appointment under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) in light of its mandatory-detention finding and denial of habeas relief. The clerk was directed to serve the order on the detention facility in McFarland and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court found both statutory conditions for mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) satisfied on the record before it.
- A pending New Jersey charge for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer supplied the enumerated-offense condition without a conviction.
- The court rejected the government's jurisdictional objections under §§ 1252(g) and 1226(e) and retained authority to review the constitutional claim.
- The petitioner received neither immediate release nor a bond hearing because the qualifying charges remained pending.
- The order separately denied the habeas petition, declared the TRO motion moot, denied appointed counsel, and directed closure of the case.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the Eastern District of California's application of the Laken Riley Act's expanded mandatory-detention provision to a noncitizen whose qualifying assault-officer charge remained pending. Its analysis turns on the statutory conditions and the continuing criminal charge, rather than treating a conviction as necessary.
The jurisdictional discussion also separates review of detention and constitutional claims from the statutory limits invoked by the government. The court's citation to cases involving dropped or dismissed charges identifies a circumstance addressed by other decisions, but this order does not decide how the Act would apply if Choc-Choc's charges later end.