Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Larry William Cortinas, a prisoner proceeding without counsel, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Stanislaus County Public Safety Center and eight individually identified staff members, deputies, nurses, and a physician. His August 3, 2026 complaint alleged denial of medical care, denial of access to grievance processes, an Americans with Disabilities Act claim, and a First Amendment claim. The order addressed only his motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, not a final adjudication of those underlying claims.
Magistrate Judge Ila C. Deiss construed Cortinas’s filing, ECF No. 2, as a motion for injunctive relief. He asked the court to stop defendants from denying medical treatment and an appointment with a named neurosurgeon, compel care prescribed by that neurosurgeon, require prescribed hydrocele surgery and other treatment, and provide an electronic tablet like those available to other incarcerated people at the facility. The requested medical directives would require affirmative action rather than merely preserve existing conditions. The order was signed on November 2, 2026, and filed on November 3, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Deiss explained that preliminary relief requires likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and consistency with the public interest. She also described the Ninth Circuit’s sliding-scale alternative involving serious merits questions and sharply favorable hardships. Because mandatory injunctions demand affirmative action, the movant faces a doubly demanding burden and must establish that the law and facts clearly favor the requested relief.
On medical treatment, the magistrate judge distinguished a prisoner’s disagreement with providers from a viable Eighth Amendment claim. An alternative-treatment claim can succeed when the selected treatment was medically unacceptable and chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive health risk. Cortinas alleged denial of his preferred treatment but did not clearly show that his surgery requests were rejected in favor of treatment meeting either requirement. The court therefore found no high likelihood of success insofar as his original claim relied on denial of the requested surgeries.
The tablet request failed on a different element. Although Cortinas wanted the same access as other inmates, he did not show irreparable harm from not having a tablet, so an injunction compelling the facility to supply one was unwarranted at that stage. The order denied Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 2). It did not dismiss the complaint or decide the ultimate merits of the medical-care, grievance, ADA, or First Amendment claims.
Key Takeaways
- A prisoner’s preference for a particular surgery or provider does not by itself establish likely success on an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim.
- The court required a clear showing that the chosen treatment was medically unacceptable and selected in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to health.
- Requests that command affirmative medical treatment are mandatory injunctions and carry a particularly demanding burden.
- The desire for equal access to an electronic tablet did not establish the irreparable harm necessary for preliminary relief.
- The denial concerned interim injunctive relief only and left the underlying civil-rights action unresolved.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the familiar Winter framework separately to two forms of requested relief, identifying likely success as the obstacle to medical directives and irreparable harm as the obstacle to tablet access. That separation shows why a single injunction motion can fail for different reasons across its component requests.
The ruling also illustrates the distinction between interim relief and final liability. Its assessment of the present record did not terminate Cortinas’s claims, but it required more than allegations of denied preferred treatment or unequal tablet access before the court would compel immediate action by jail officials.