California Case Summaries

Tracy Taylor v. Jeff Macomber, et al., No. 2:26-cv-01906 DJC SCR P (E.D. Cal., signed Nov. 2, 2026, filed Nov. 3, 2026) — Magistrate judge allows four religious-freedom claims to proceed, orders Macomber and Arce to respond within 45 days, and recommends dismissal of Macomber’s individual-capacity claims and four other defendants

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Tracy Taylor v. Jeff Macomber, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Sean C. Riordan (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, by Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller, 2024)
Date Decided
2026-11-03
Docket No.
2:26-cv-01906
Status
Unreported
Topics
prisoner civil rights, First Amendment free exercise, RLUIPA, California Bane Act, California Penal Code § 5009, traditional mandate under CCP § 1085, § 1915A screening, official and individual capacity, removal jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, findings and recommendations

Background

Tracy Taylor, an incarcerated practitioner of Thelema since 1983, filed a pro se complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court on April 29, 2025, naming six California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation officials. He alleged that regulations treating tobacco as contraband and restrictions on religious property burdened practices requiring tobacco on his altar, in a charm bag, and during ceremonies. He cited earlier litigation over tobacco use in the “Wheel of Love” ceremony and California Penal Code § 5030.1's religious-use exemption. Taylor alleged that Warden Carlos Arce denied his requests and offered kinnikinnick, which Taylor said did not conform to his religious expression. Service on Jeff Macomber, Arce, and H. Moseley was completed on April 22, 2026. Those defendants removed the action on May 22, 2026, and requested screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The magistrate judge found removal timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) and venue proper because Sacramento County is within the Eastern District of California. The First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims supplied federal-question jurisdiction, and the related state-law claims warranted supplemental jurisdiction. The complaint contained five counts, including two Bane Act counts that the court treated as one. Taylor sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning religious artifacts, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. At screening, the court accepted the allegations as true, construed the complaint favorably and liberally, and applied the facial-plausibility standard rather than deciding the ultimate merits.

The Court’s Holding

The operative order identifies four cognizable claims: First Amendment free exercise against Macomber officially and Arce individually and officially; RLUIPA against Macomber and Arce officially; a Bane Act claim against Macomber officially and Arce individually and officially; and a Penal Code § 5009 claim, construed as a traditional-mandate claim under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085, against Macomber officially. The policy allegations sufficiently alleged a substantial burden at screening, while Taylor's correspondence with Arce and Arce's denial of his request sufficiently alleged Arce's personal participation. The court declined to apply the Turner factors on the pleadings. It also limited RLUIPA to official capacities because individual-capacity monetary damages are unavailable.

The court found no individual-capacity claim against Macomber or Ron Broomfield because the allegations concerned policymaking rather than personal participation at Salinas Valley State Prison. It found the allegations against Moseley, H. Agilera, and L. Pennisi insufficient because they concerned grievance and appeal denials without other unconstitutional conduct. Although the analysis found claims adequately alleged against Broomfield officially, the court recommended his dismissal as redundant because Macomber could address the policies and had already been served. The order directs Macomber and Arce to file responsive pleadings within 45 days. Separately, it recommends dismissal without prejudice and without leave to amend of Taylor's individual-capacity claims against Macomber and of Broomfield, Moseley, Agilera, and Pennissi. Those recommendations were submitted to the district judge, with objections due within 21 days after service.

Key Takeaways

  • Allegations that prison policies barred religious artifacts and that Arce denied a specific tobacco request while offering a nonconforming substitute were sufficient to allege a substantial burden under the First Amendment and RLUIPA at screening.
  • The court did not decide whether legitimate penological interests justified the restrictions, expressly leaving the Turner analysis for a later stage rather than resolving it on the pleadings.
  • The order itself requires only the already-served Macomber and Arce to respond within 45 days; the proposed dismissals are recommendations, not final dismissals by the district judge.
  • The court construed the § 5009 count as a § 1085 traditional-mandate claim and allowed it to proceed against Macomber officially despite conflicting authority over federal-court mandamus proceedings, leaving supplemental-jurisdiction and comity issues for briefing.
  • The court declined to address potential Eleventh Amendment or other immunities and Taylor's asserted administrative exhaustion without party briefing, so those issues remain open.

Why It Matters

The decision applies § 1915A screening to a prisoner complaint filed in state court and later removed, while acknowledging that the defendants supplied no authority requiring that practice. It distinguishes policy-based official-capacity claims from damages claims requiring personal participation and explains why grievance handling alone did not support liability against the reviewing officials. It also preserves, rather than prematurely resolves, immunity, exhaustion, and the fact-intensive justification for the challenged restrictions.

The document contains an internal tension concerning Broomfield: the analysis recognizes cognizable official-capacity claims against him, the redundancy discussion recommends his dismissal, and line 15.10 also says the undersigned “will order service on Defendant Broomfield.” The numbered conclusion nevertheless recommends Broomfield's dismissal and directs responses only from Macomber and Arce. The article therefore does not treat that isolated service statement as an additional operative directive or silently reconcile it with the recommendation.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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