Reported / Citable
Background
Dove A. Bogguess and Douglas John Marrone filed a December 2024 putative class action against Uber Technologies, Inc. under California's unfair competition and false advertising laws. They alleged that Uber represented its displayed upfront price as the amount consumers would pay, yet frequently charged more when it had underestimated a ride's time or length. They sought to stop advertising prices below what consumers actually would pay and requested restitution or disgorgement of excess charges for themselves and a proposed California class. The complaint's allegations remained allegations; this appeal did not decide whether Uber engaged in the asserted deception.
Uber's January 2023 agreement required individual arbitration and waived nonindividual relief. Its savings and severability provisions sent certain claims affected by an unenforceable waiver to court while preserving arbitration of remaining claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration of individual relief, dismiss representative requests, and stay the case. In July 2025, the trial court denied that motion. It found the requested injunction public under McGill v. Citibank and, relying on Blair and Jack, treated the agreement's reference to 'claims' as encompassing the UCL and FAL causes of action rather than permitting remedies within them to be split. The appellate court stayed trial proceedings pending appeal and reviewed the legal issues de novo.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that the requested injunction was public relief because its primary purpose and effect would be to stop allegedly deceptive pricing threatening future injury to the general public. The complaint expressly challenged public advertising and sought compliance with consumer-protection laws. Even apart from public-facing advertisements, Khan v. Coinbase controlled the reasoning: requiring someone to create an account did not remove potential customers from the protected public. The court rejected distinctions based on individualized ride quotes and the additional request for money. It also declined Uber's reliance on Hodges and found no need to decide whether Hodges created a separate individualized-inquiry test, because Uber had not distinguished the forward-looking relief from the public injunction recognized in Blair.
The court next found the agreement genuinely ambiguous about whether 'claim' meant an entire cause of action or only a request for a particular remedy. Blair and Jack supported plaintiffs' construction, while Uber's reading was also reasonable; Viking River and Adolph did not construe materially identical language. Civil Code section 1654 therefore required construction against Uber, the drafter, with particular force because this was an adhesive agreement. The FAA did not preempt that neutral rule. Unlike Lamps Plus, applying it here did not manufacture consent to class arbitration or another scheme inconsistent with arbitration's fundamental attributes; it prevented arbitration without consent. The entire action consequently remained in court. The court affirmed the order and awarded plaintiffs appellate costs.
Key Takeaways
- An injunction targeting allegedly deceptive pricing on a widely accessible platform can be public relief even when account creation, individualized transactions, and accompanying monetary claims are involved.
- The opinion does not establish liability for deceptive pricing or certify a class; it decides where the pleaded action must proceed.
- Uber's waiver could not eliminate the statutory right to seek public injunctive relief in every forum under McGill.
- The word 'claim' in these savings provisions supported more than one reasonable construction, so section 1654 resolved the uncertainty against Uber rather than compelling piecemeal arbitration.
- Lamps Plus did not require preemption here because construing the adhesive agreement against its drafter reinforced consent instead of imposing class arbitration without consent.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Khan's potential-customer analysis to Uber's pricing practices and rejects attempts to make public injunctive relief depend on unrestricted advertising, uniform quotes, or the absence of restitution and disgorgement requests. It also explains why monetary relief does not necessarily change the public character of an injunction aimed at ongoing consumer-protection violations.
On contract interpretation, the opinion distinguishes using contra proferentem to impose class arbitration from using it to determine whether parties agreed to divide remedies between court and arbitration. It disavows overly broad dicta in Vaughn and emphasizes that drafters seeking severance of particular remedies must address that allocation clearly. The immediate result is affirmance, not a final merits judgment, with the litigation remaining in court subject to the appellate stay's resolution.