Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Eric Perez Sanchez, a native and citizen of Cuba, entered the United States on February 8, 2022. He was placed in removal proceedings, released on his own recognizance the next day, later applied for asylum, and received employment authorization. He was arrested on criminal charges in Tampa, Florida, on February 1, 2026, but the local prosecutor dropped all pending charges on February 20. Immigration officials re-detained him that same day, and he was transferred to the Mesa Verde Detention Facility on or about June 14, 2026.
Sanchez requested a custody redetermination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but an immigration judge took no action on that request. He filed his § 2241 petition on July 27, 2026, alleging that detention without a bond hearing violated his Fifth Amendment procedural due-process rights. At filing, he had been detained for more than five months without a hearing addressing danger or flight risk. An immigration judge ordered his removal to Cuba on August 12, but he reserved his appeal rights. Although he did not supply the court's requested proof of an appeal, the EOIR case-information website showed that the BIA received an appeal on September 29 and that it remained open.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge explained that noncitizens apprehended in the interior generally fall under § 1226(a)'s discretionary detention regime. An immigration judge may review the initial custody determination before a removal order becomes final, and a material change in circumstances can support another bond hearing. By contrast, § 1231(a) governs mandatory detention during the removal period after an administratively final removal order. Such an order becomes final upon a BIA affirmance or expiration of the deadline to seek BIA review. Because Sanchez's BIA appeal remained pending, his removal order was not administratively final and § 1226(a), rather than § 1231(a), applied; the respondent acknowledged that framework in answering the petition.
The court found that Sanchez had received none of § 1226(a)'s procedural protections against unjustified detention for more than eight months and held that this constituted a procedural due-process violation. Relying on Feng v. Lyons and the flexibility recognized in Burnett v. Lampert, it identified immediate release as the appropriate remedy. The court directly granted Sanchez's in-forma-pauperis motion. It separately recommended granting habeas relief, ordering immediate release and return of his documents and possessions, requiring compliance certification within three days of any final release order, and prescribing seven days' notice plus a clear-and-convincing-evidence bond hearing before any re-detention. It also recommended leaving detention after an executable final removal order unaddressed and directing service of any release order, judgment for Sanchez, and case closure.
Key Takeaways
- A pending BIA appeal prevented Sanchez's removal order from becoming administratively final, so his detention remained governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than the mandatory post-final-order regime in § 1231(a).
- The magistrate judge concluded that denying Sanchez the statutory protections against unjustified detention for more than eight months violated procedural due process.
- Immediate release was the recommended habeas remedy, but the release and related directives remained recommendations requiring action by the assigned district judge.
- The proposed re-detention conditions would require at least seven days' notice and an immigration-judge bond hearing at which the government must prove flight risk or community danger by clear and convincing evidence.
- The recommendations expressly would not resolve detention following an executable final removal order, and the court shortened the period for written objections to seven days because of the relief at issue and the completed written briefing.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the distinction between discretionary detention during ongoing removal proceedings and mandatory detention after an administratively final removal order. It treats the statutory opportunity to contest custody as meaningful process rather than a formality that can be postponed for months. The analysis also shows how a habeas court may use the record of an open BIA appeal, even without the petitioner's requested status submission, to determine which detention statute governs.
The recommended remedy goes beyond simply directing a delayed bond hearing: it proposes release, prompt compliance reporting, and procedural safeguards against re-detention while expressly reserving the different circumstances that could arise under an executable final removal order. Because these are findings and recommendations, their practical effect depends on district-judge review and any timely objections; only the in-forma-pauperis ruling was immediately ordered in this document.