Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Curtis Lee Henderson, Sr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this prisoner civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Fresno County Jail and individual defendants. After the court issued an amended order to show cause concerning Arce, Beresouskaya, and Gill, Henderson filed a motion titled as a request for default under Rule 55(b)(2). He sought default judgment against Arce, Beresouskaya, Gill, and Lopez, asserting that they had been personally served on April 28, 2026, and had failed to answer by May 19. Lopez opposed because he had filed an answer on May 19. Gill and Arce separately moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and insufficient service, or alternatively to quash service.
Gill declared that he had already separated from the assignment associated with the jail when the papers were delivered to Sergeant Nunley and that he had never authorized Nunley to accept service. Arce's motion largely mirrored Gill's. Henderson argued that both men had been properly served, that Nunley could receive documents entering the jail, and that another case showed tactical evasion of service. Beresouskaya took a different procedural course: although personally served through Nunley and given an additional 14 days to respond to the show-cause order and complaint, she did not adequately respond or file a responsive pleading.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge treated Henderson's request as seeking the appropriate first step under Rule 55 rather than immediately awarding default judgment. The court explained that Rule 55 requires entry of default by the clerk before a plaintiff may seek default judgment. It denied the motion as to Lopez because Lopez had answered on May 19. Because the answer lacked proof that Henderson had been served by mail as required for a pro se prisoner, the court directed the clerk to send Henderson a copy and instructed Lopez to ensure proper service of future filings. The court granted the motion as to Beresouskaya, but only by directing the clerk to enter default under Rule 55(a), not default judgment.
For Gill and Arce, the court found insufficient service based on their declarations. Once service was challenged, Henderson bore the burden of proving validity. Rule 4(e)(2)(C) permits delivery to an agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service, but the court emphasized that the agent must be specifically designated for that purpose. Henderson supplied no evidence that either defendant authorized Nunley; his assertions about Nunley's authority and personnel files did not overcome their declarations. Actual knowledge of the lawsuit could not replace proper service. Exercising the discretion recognized by Ninth Circuit precedent, the magistrate judge recommended denying dismissal but granting the alternative motions to quash service.
Key Takeaways
- Henderson's default motion was denied as to Lopez because Lopez had filed an answer, although the clerk was directed to serve Henderson with a copy because the answer lacked proper proof of service.
- The clerk was directed to enter default against Beresouskaya under Rule 55(a), but the court did not enter a default judgment against her.
- Gill and Arce established insufficient service, and Henderson's unsupported assertions did not prove that Sergeant Nunley was specifically authorized to accept process for them.
- The magistrate judge recommended denying Gill's and Arce's motions to dismiss while granting their alternative requests to quash service, leaving those recommendations subject to district-judge review.
- The court declined to judicially notice the disputed assertion that Gill and Arce had tactically evaded service in another action because a public record does not make every disputed factual assertion within it judicially noticeable.
Why It Matters
The decision separates the two stages of Rule 55 and applies the burden of proving valid service without treating actual notice as a substitute for substantial compliance with Rule 4. It also explains why delivery to a jail employee does not, without evidence of specific authorization, establish service on an individual defendant. The court rejected Henderson's argument that due process requires only notice reasonably calculated to inform him of the action.
The proposed cure preserves the claims against Gill and Arce rather than ending them on the present service record. If the district judge adopts the recommendations, the clerk would send Henderson new service materials, and he would have 30 days after service of that adopting order to submit the notice and corrected documents. The court noted that Gill no longer works at the jail and suggested consulting the Medical Board of California's website for an address; it stated that Arce remains employed by Wellpath and suggested researching an appropriate service address. The findings and recommendations carry a 14-day objection period.