Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Devin Trevone Lamar, III, a former county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Lewis and Franco for excessive force and failure to intervene under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not file an opposition, prompting the court to order him to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff responded, requesting an additional forty-five days to serve an opposition so he could copy and attach evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies. The court granted the extension on October 29, 2026.
Defendants then opposed the extension, arguing that because Plaintiff's deadline to file his opposition had already passed, the court must find good cause and excusable neglect. The court had already found good cause in its October 29 order, so it proceeded to analyze only excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) and the four-factor test from Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010): (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge affirmed the October 29, 2026 order granting Plaintiff an extension to file his opposition by December 14, 2026. The court found no meaningful prejudice to Defendants if Plaintiff filed an opposition to their motion for summary judgment by that date. The delay was minimal with no impact on the proceedings.
Plaintiff's reasoning for failing to file an opposition—his emergency relocation from Georgia to Maryland and temporary lack of functioning administrative and printing equipment—and his request for additional time to attach evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies appeared valid and sufficient to grant a short extension of time. The court was not persuaded that Plaintiff's failure to produce the same evidence in a separate lawsuit showed a lack of good faith or provided a good reason to deny Plaintiff the opportunity to produce evidence in this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed its October 29, 2026 order.
Key Takeaways
- A pro se litigant's emergency relocation and temporary lack of access to printing and administrative equipment can constitute excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1) justifying an extension to oppose summary judgment.
- The court will not deny an extension based on a litigant's failure to produce evidence in a separate, unrelated lawsuit, as that does not demonstrate bad faith in the current action.
- Minimal delay with no prejudice to the opposing party and no impact on proceedings supports a finding of excusable neglect, particularly for pro se litigants facing practical obstacles.
- When a court has already found good cause for an extension, the remaining inquiry under Rule 6(b)(1) focuses on the Ahanchian excusable-neglect factors.
- The decision reflects the court's willingness to accommodate pro se litigants' practical difficulties in litigating during transitions and emergencies.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the application of the Ninth Circuit's Ahanchian excusable-neglect standard in a prisoner civil rights case, reinforcing that courts will consider the practical realities faced by pro se litigants when evaluating requests for extensions. It confirms that a litigant's conduct in other cases does not automatically establish bad faith in the pending action, and that minimal, non-prejudicial delays supported by legitimate personal emergencies warrant accommodation.
The ruling preserves the plaintiff's opportunity to present evidence of administrative exhaustion, a threshold issue in prisoner litigation, rather than ending the case on procedural grounds. It also demonstrates how magistrate judges manage pretrial deadlines in pro se prisoner cases while balancing the need for orderly proceedings against the obstacles incarcerated and formerly incarcerated litigants face.