California Case Summaries

Leonette Alfaro Sevilla v. Christopher J. LaRose, Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al. — District court grants habeas petition, holding CHNV parolee with theft conviction is detained under discretionary § 1226(a) not mandatory § 1226(c) and orders immediate release subject to parole conditions

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Leonette Alfaro Sevilla v. Christopher J. LaRose, Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (Joseph R. Biden Jr., 2022)
Date Decided
2026-11-03
Docket No.
3:26-cv-05782
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration detention, habeas corpus, mandatory detention, CHNV parole, due process, statutory interpretation, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)

Background

Petitioner Leonette Alfaro Sevilla, a citizen of Nicaragua, entered the United States on April 10, 2024, after being issued a CHNV travel authorization and was paroled into the country at a designated port of entry. She subsequently applied for asylum and received a work permit and social security card. In June 2026, she was arrested and later convicted of Grand Theft, a third-degree felony under Florida law, and sentenced to time served. DHS issued an administrative warrant on June 7, 2026, and served it on September 16, 2026, after she was transferred to immigration detention at Otay Mesa Detention Center, where her removal proceedings remain ongoing.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing her detention violates the INA and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because she is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not the mandatory detention provision § 1226(c). Respondents contended that her grand theft conviction triggers mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). The court also rejected Respondents' jurisdictional challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g), consistent with prior rulings in this district.

The Court’s Holding

The court held that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), not § 1226(c), because mandatory detention under § 1226(c) requires the noncitizen to be inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7), and Petitioner meets none of these grounds. She entered at a designated port of entry and was paroled, so § 1182(a)(6)(A) does not apply; there is no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation under § 1182(a)(6)(C); and at the time she applied for admission she possessed a valid CHNV travel authorization, so § 1182(a)(7) does not apply. The court granted the petition and ordered immediate release subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole, with a requirement that any future re-detention be preceded by a hearing before an immigration judge at which the noncitizen bears the burden of showing she is not a danger or flight risk.

The court further held that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, is the appropriate remedy because post-deprivation hearings cannot adequately safeguard against erroneous deprivation of liberty. The court cited multiple district court decisions reaching the same conclusion for CHNV parolees and other lawfully admitted noncitizens with criminal convictions.

Key Takeaways

  • A noncitizen paroled into the United States under the CHNV program who is later convicted of a theft offense is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because parole constitutes admission for purposes of the inadmissibility grounds that trigger § 1226(c).
  • The mandatory detention provision § 1226(c) applies only to noncitizens inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7); a lawful parolee does not fall within these categories even with a qualifying criminal conviction.
  • When the government fails to respond to a due process challenge to detention under § 1226(a), and the court has repeatedly granted similar petitions, immediate release is warranted rather than a bond hearing.
  • Any future re-detention of the petitioner requires a prior hearing before an immigration judge where the noncitizen bears the burden of proving she is not a danger to the community or a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • The court rejected the government's jurisdictional argument under 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g), reaffirming that habeas jurisdiction exists to enforce constitutional due process rights in the context of removal proceedings.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces a growing line of district court rulings in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere holding that CHNV parolees and other lawfully admitted noncitizens are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) solely based on criminal convictions, because the statutory text requires inadmissibility under specific paragraphs of § 1182(a) that do not encompass parolees. The ruling clarifies that the government's conclusory assertions cannot satisfy its burden to show mandatory detention applies, and it mandates immediate release with procedural protections for any future detention, strengthening due process protections for parolees in removal proceedings.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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