Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Gregg Berkeley brought ERISA claims against Intel Corporation and the Administrative Committee of the Intel Minimum Pension Plan, alleging that the Plan's use of the GAM-83 mortality table and PBGC interest rates to convert Single Life Annuities (SLAs) to Joint Survivor Annuities (JSAs) violated ERISA's joint and survivor annuity requirements (29 U.S.C. § 1055), anti-forfeiture rules (29 U.S.C. § 1053), and fiduciary duties. On April 28, 2026, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding insufficient evidence that "actuarial equivalence" required the use of "reasonable" actuarial assumptions. Judgment was entered on April 9, 2026. Plaintiff then filed a Rule 59(e) motion challenging only the court's finding that his § 1053 claim relied on the same theory as his § 1055 claim.
In the prior order, the court held that the evidence did not show a "reasonableness" requirement could be inferred from the ordinary meaning of "actuarial equivalent," congressional intent, or Treasury regulations. Regarding the § 1053 claim, the court observed that while forfeiture claims are not always derivative of actuarial equivalence claims, plaintiff relied on the same theory for both—that defendants unlawfully decreased the value of his benefits under § 1053 because the Plan applied unreasonable actuarial assumptions in violation of § 1055. Absent an alternative theory, judgment was granted on the § 1053 claim as well.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, finding no clear error in its determination that plaintiff's § 1053 claim relied on the same "unreasonable actuarial assumptions" theory as his § 1055 claim. The court identified three reasons: first, the complaint repeatedly alleged that defendants violated § 1053 by failing to provide "actuarially equivalent" benefits, citing paragraphs 44, 114, and 115. Second, the complaint's introduction explicitly linked both claims, stating that paying participants less than the actuarial equivalent value violated both § 1053 and § 1055. Third, although plaintiff now invoked § 1053's "normal retirement benefit" language, the complaint immediately tied forfeiture to "adjustments in excess of reasonable actuarial reductions" and cited the same Treasury regulation (26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-11(b)(2)) for both claims.
The court also noted a pattern: during the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff argued he never claimed § 1055 required "reasonable" actuarial factors, but the complaint plainly stated otherwise. The court found plaintiff's attempts to distance himself from his own allegations unavailing. Because the court previously held that "actuarial equivalence" does not require "reasonable" actuarial factors, both claims necessarily fail on the theory plaintiff actually alleged and argued.
Key Takeaways
- A Rule 59(e) motion is an extraordinary remedy requiring manifest error of law or fact, newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law; mere disagreement with the court's reasoning is insufficient.
- When a plaintiff's complaint and summary judgment opposition consistently allege that both § 1053 and § 1055 claims rest on the same "unreasonable actuarial assumptions" theory, the court may treat the forfeiture claim as derivative of the actuarial equivalence claim for purposes of summary judgment.
- The court's prior holding that "actuarial equivalence" under § 1055 does not require "reasonable" actuarial assumptions—based on statutory text, congressional intent, and Treasury regulations—dooms a § 1053 claim that relies on the same theory.
- A plaintiff cannot successfully use a Rule 59(e) motion to advance a new legal theory (e.g., "normal retirement benefit" under § 1053) that was not the basis of the original claims, especially when the complaint's allegations contradict the new theory.
- The court may consider a party's litigation conduct—including arguments made at hearings and in prior briefing—when evaluating whether a Rule 59(e) motion reflects a genuine error or an attempt to relitigate a decided issue.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar for Rule 59(e) relief in ERISA cases and illustrates how courts scrutinize whether a plaintiff's anti-forfeiture claim under § 1053 is truly independent of an actuarial equivalence claim under § 1055. The ruling clarifies that when a plaintiff's pleadings and arguments consistently tie forfeiture to the same "reasonableness" theory rejected for actuarial equivalence, the § 1053 claim will fall with the § 1055 claim. The case also highlights the importance of pleading alternative theories distinctly if a plaintiff wishes to preserve independent grounds for relief.