Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Nesly Charlot, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States on May 6, 2023, and was later released from immigration custody on parole issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The order recites that he applied for asylum, received a work authorization document, was legally employed, filed his taxes, held a driver's license, and had no criminal history. Immigration authorities re-detained him in New York on June 28, 2026. He was later transferred to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in El Centro, California, where he remained detained.
According to the order, no pre-deprivation hearing was held before the re-detention, and he had not been given a bond hearing. On October 12, 2026, he petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking the court to assume jurisdiction and order his immediate release or, alternatively, an adequate bond hearing. He argued that his detention violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Respondents stated that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). They acknowledged, however, that the court's prior decisions would control the result if the court adhered to them. They did not oppose the petition and deferred to the court on the appropriate relief. In a footnote they also argued that the court could avoid the constitutional question by ordering a bond hearing, relying on the principle that courts ordinarily do not decide a constitutional question when another ground can dispose of the case.
The Court’s Holding
The court first rejected the avoidance argument. It found that a due process analysis was necessary here, so it would not simply order a bond hearing and leave the constitutional question unresolved.
On the merits, the court reasoned that Petitioner was entitled to due process before his parole was terminated. That meant written notice, the reasons for the termination, and an opportunity to contest the determination. It relied on 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) and § 241.13(i)(3), which call for notice of the reasons for revocation and a prompt informal interview. It also relied on a prior Southern District of California decision, McSweeney v. Warden. Petitioner contended, and Respondents did not dispute, that he received no individualized determination and no opportunity to be heard before detention. The court therefore found that the revocation of his release and his detention violated his due process rights.
The court granted the petition. It ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately under the previously determined conditions. It also enjoined them from re-detaining him without complying with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 and due process. The court directed the Clerk to close the matter. It did not decide whether § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention applies to him, and it did not reach the alternative request for a bond hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen released on immigration parole may be entitled to notice, stated reasons, and an opportunity to respond before parole is revoked and he is re-detained.
- The government's decision not to oppose a petition does not relieve the court of the constitutional question. This court expressly declined to resolve the case on narrower bond-hearing grounds.
- The remedy here was immediate release under the prior conditions, rather than only a bond hearing, because the court found a due process violation in the revocation itself.
- The injunction bars re-detention unless Respondents comply with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 and due process, so future detention is not foreclosed if proper procedures are followed.
- The order is an unpublished district court ruling that largely rests on the government's non-opposition and an earlier district decision, so it carries little precedential weight.
Why It Matters
The order is a short, case-specific ruling, but it shows how a district court in the Southern District of California treats the re-detention of noncitizens who were previously released on parole. The court treated termination of parole without individualized process as a due process violation. It remedied the violation with release, not merely a bond hearing. It also applied the court's own earlier reasoning in a setting where the government declined to contest the outcome.
Its reach is limited. It is not a published opinion, it binds only the parties, and it does not analyze the statutory mandatory-detention question the government raised. The decision rests heavily on the undisputed absence of any process and on McSweeney, so other petitioners with a different record, or a government that contests the petition, may see different results. Whether Respondents later seek to re-detain Petitioner through compliant procedures is not addressed in the order.