Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Dennis Shipman, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo Advisors and Chubb Ltd. alleging the unlawful withholding of $2,078.22 he deposited with Wells Fargo. Along with his complaint, Shipman filed multiple motions: a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, a motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to appear remotely at all future proceedings. The court addressed each motion in a single order dated October 22, 2026.
The court noted that Shipman alleged Wells Fargo had withheld his funds since January 2026, yet he did not seek injunctive relief until approximately nine months later. Shipman's affidavit described various communications with Wells Fargo about the withheld funds but did not establish that he provided notice of his intent to seek a temporary restraining order, nor did he provide a sufficient reason why such notice could not be given.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Shipman's motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and indicated a separate screening order would issue addressing the sufficiency of his claims, issuance of summons, and service. The motion for summary judgment was denied without prejudice; the court stated that if the case proceeds, a case schedule will be set with a specified time for filing summary judgment motions after the close of discovery, at which point the motion may be refiled.
The motion to appear remotely was denied without prejudice. The court explained that some proceedings are appropriate for remote hearings while others, such as trial or evidentiary hearings, are not. Shipman may file a motion to appear remotely for any specific hearing that is set. The motion for a temporary restraining order was denied because Shipman's nine-month delay in seeking injunctive relief implied a lack of urgency and irreparable harm, citing Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). Additionally, Shipman failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 65-1(a)(5) by not certifying efforts to provide notice to the adverse party or explaining why notice could not be provided.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff's significant delay in seeking a temporary restraining order undermines the showing of irreparable harm and urgency required for such extraordinary relief.
- Compliance with notice requirements under Rule 65(b) and local rules is mandatory for ex parte temporary restraining order motions; a plaintiff must certify efforts to notify the opposing party or justify the absence of notice.
- Motions for summary judgment filed before discovery are premature and will be denied without prejudice, with leave to refile after discovery closes pursuant to a court-ordered schedule.
- Blanket motions to appear remotely for all future proceedings are disfavored; courts prefer case-by-case determinations based on the nature of each hearing.
- Pro se litigants granted in forma pauperis status remain subject to all procedural rules and will receive a separate screening order evaluating the legal sufficiency of their claims.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the court's management of a pro se indigent civil case at the earliest stage, balancing access to justice through in forma pauperis status with strict adherence to procedural requirements for injunctive relief and dispositive motions. The decision reinforces Ninth Circuit precedent that undue delay in seeking a TRO negates the irreparable harm prerequisite, and it underscores the mandatory nature of notice certification under Rule 65 and local rules.
The court's case-management approach—denying premature summary judgment and blanket remote-appearance requests without prejudice—provides a template for efficient docket control while preserving the litigant's rights to refile at appropriate junctures. The order also directs the pro se plaintiff to available legal resources and reminds him that all court rules apply equally to self-represented litigants.