California Case Summaries

In re Melamed: Trustee Fails to Prove Fraudulent Transfer; Ninth Circuit Affirms Bankruptcy Court’s Factual Findings

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
In re: Shawn Sharon Melamed, Jenous Tootian, Debtors; Amy Goldman, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Shawn Sharon Melamed and Jenous Tootian, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Shawn Dardashti, an individual, Defendant-Appellee
Court
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge
Bumatay; VanDyke; Mendoza, Jr.
Date Decided
2026-10-22
Docket No.
25-3606
Status
Unreported
Topics
bankruptcy, fraudulent transfer, clear error review, credibility determinations, property valuation, Chapter 7 trustee, bench trial

Background

This appeal arises from a fraudulent transfer action brought by Amy Goldman, the Chapter 7 Trustee for the estates of debtors Shawn Sharon Melamed and Jenous Tootian, against Shawn Dardashti. Following a four-day bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that the Trustee failed to carry her burden of proof and entered judgment in favor of Dardashti. The Trustee appealed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. The Trustee now appeals to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court applied an incorrect legal standard, erred in its property valuation, miscalculated rent payments as loan payments, and made erroneous credibility determinations regarding Dardashti and the debtors' attorney, Rebekah Shadpour.

The core dispute centered on whether payments made by Melamed to Dardashti constituted rent or disguised loan payments on a $1.3 million loan the Trustee alleged existed. The Trustee relied on an expert valuation placing the property value above $1.15 million and argued that rent payments exceeding Dardashti's carrying costs evidenced a loan. Dardashti contended the payments covered carrying costs on the property he purchased for $1,150,000, which included an undisclosed $200,000 fee. The bankruptcy court credited Dardashti's carrying-cost explanation, found the Trustee's expert valuation deficient, and deemed Shadpour 'shockingly not credible' due to rehearsed testimony and bias. The court also found Dardashti complicit in a separate scheme to defraud a lender (SPS) but determined this did not establish the existence of the alleged loan.

The Court’s Holding

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's verdict for Dardashti. The panel reviewed the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, emphasizing that a finding is clearly erroneous only if illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. The court rejected the Trustee's argument that the bankruptcy court applied the wrong legal standard, noting that despite one incorrect statement in the summary of the standard, the opinion as a whole showed the court properly weighed evidence and assessed credibility rather than drawing inferences in Dardashti's favor. The bankruptcy court had explicitly considered the self-interested motives of both parties and found Dardashti complicit in fraud, which would be inconsistent with a standard requiring all inferences to favor the defendant.

On the factual challenges, the Ninth Circuit found no clear error. The bankruptcy court's valuation of the property at $1,150,000 was supported by specific citations to deficiencies in the Trustee's expert report and record evidence, and the fact that the debtors' attorney once listed the property for $2,150,000 did not undermine this finding because the listing never resulted in a sale. The court also declined to re-calculate the rent-versus-loan payment analysis, noting that the Trustee's proposed computation reprised a 'loan value' theory the bankruptcy court had rejected as speculative and misaligned with the actual $1,384,113.04 Dardashti paid. Finally, the panel deferred to the bankruptcy court's credibility determinations, particularly its finding that Shadpour was not credible based on specific observations of rehearsed testimony, defensiveness on cross-examination, evasiveness, and bias stemming from a separate lawsuit with Dardashti over the $200,000 fee. The court noted it did not rely on Dardashti's credibility regarding whether he read a key document (the AALT), as the bankruptcy court itself found it could not determine if he read it and suspected he may have known of the deception.

Key Takeaways

  • The Ninth Circuit will not re-weigh evidence or make new credibility determinations on appeal; clear error review requires a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
  • A bankruptcy court's isolated misstatement of the legal standard in a summary does not require reversal if the opinion as a whole demonstrates correct application of the law and proper credibility assessments.
  • Property valuation findings supported by specific critiques of an opposing expert's methodology and record evidence will survive clear error review even if other valuation evidence exists.
  • Credibility findings based on specific, observed witness demeanor—such as rehearsed testimony, defensiveness, evasiveness, and bias—are entitled to special deference and rarely constitute clear error.
  • A finding that a defendant participated in a separate fraudulent scheme does not automatically establish liability for the specific fraudulent transfer at issue; the plaintiff retains the burden of proof on each element.

Why It Matters

This memorandum disposition reinforces the highly deferential standard of review applied to bankruptcy court factual findings and credibility determinations after a bench trial. It clarifies that an isolated error in articulating the legal standard in a summary section does not mandate reversal if the court's actual analysis reflects proper factfinding. The decision underscores the difficulty of overturning valuation findings on appeal when the trial court identifies specific methodological flaws in an expert's report. It also illustrates that a defendant's admitted involvement in related misconduct does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden to prove the specific transfer was fraudulent by a preponderance of the evidence. The ruling serves as a practical reminder that appellate courts function as a check on legal error, not as a second trier of fact.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

Scroll to Top