Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Judiel Williams, a 28-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on May 6, 2014, as an immediate relative (IR-2) of a lawful permanent resident after inspection at a designated port of entry. In 2017, he was convicted in Broward County, Florida, of driving without a license and causing death with a vehicle, a third-degree felony, and sentenced to five years' probation. On August 26, 2025, he was convicted in Collier County, Florida, of fleeing/eluding a law enforcement officer with lights and sirens activated (third-degree felony) and driving while license suspended, revoked (second offense, first-degree misdemeanor), receiving a 75-day jail sentence. ICE detained Williams on or about October 27, 2025, and he has remained in continuous custody since. On October 28, 2025, he was issued a Notice to Appear charging removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme. An immigration judge denied bond on February 26, 2026, finding Williams a flight risk and danger to the community. Williams has three U.S. citizen children, community ties in Naples, Florida, and employment history with a solar electrical company whose CEO supported his release. Respondents do not contest his factual allegations.
Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 10, 2026, raising a Fifth Amendment due process claim for prolonged detention exceeding six months. Respondents timely filed a response on August 20, 2026, and Williams filed a traverse on September 3, 2026. The matter proceeded before Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The court first identified the statutory authority governing detention: although the Notice to Appear cited 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), which triggers mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(B), the immigration judge determined on February 6, 2026, that detention proceeded under § 1226(a) and conducted a bond hearing. Neither party appealed that determination or the flight-risk/danger findings.
The Court’s Holding
The court analyzed Williams's due process claim in two steps: whether a protected liberty interest exists, and what procedures are required to protect it. Under § 1226(a), the government makes an initial custody determination, and the noncitizen may be released upon showing that release would not pose a danger and that the noncitizen is likely to appear for proceedings. Section 1226(a) provides an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change. Williams received a bond hearing before an immigration judge on February 6, 2026, at which the judge denied bond based on findings that he is a flight risk and a danger to the community. Williams does not dispute receiving this hearing but objects that the government should have borne the burden of proving flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence.
The court concluded that procedural due process does not require a second bond hearing with a heightened burden on the government. Citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), the court held that even if Williams has a protected liberty interest given his approximately 11.5 months of detention, he received the process he was due through an individualized bond determination by an immigration judge. The court noted that Williams retains the right to seek another bond hearing if circumstances materially change. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus and directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of respondents and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) requires only an initial bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge with the opportunity to present evidence and appeal, not a second hearing with a heightened government burden.
- An immigration judge's determination that detention proceeds under § 1226(a) rather than mandatory detention under § 1226(c), when unappealed, governs the due process analysis.
- Approximately 11.5 months of detention under § 1226(a) does not, without more, violate due process where an individualized bond determination has been made.
- A noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) retains the right to seek a new bond hearing upon a material change in circumstances.
- The court declined to impose a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on the government at bond hearings under § 1226(a), following Ninth Circuit precedent in Rodriguez Diaz.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the procedural framework for immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) in the Eastern District of California, clarifying that due process is satisfied by a single individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge with standard procedural protections. The ruling aligns with Ninth Circuit precedent in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, which rejected the argument that prolonged detention under § 1226(a) triggers a heightened burden of proof for the government. The decision also illustrates the practical significance of the immigration judge's initial statutory classification: because the IJ determined § 1226(a) applied and neither party appealed, the court analyzed the detention under the discretionary detention framework rather than the mandatory detention framework of § 1226(c), which carries different procedural implications. The recommendation preserves the noncitizen's right to seek subsequent bond hearings upon changed circumstances, maintaining a safety valve for prolonged detention claims.