Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Mohammed Abdullah Ba Gunaid, a native of Saudi Arabia and citizen of Yemen and Dominica, entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa on June 11, 2024, and remained after his authorized stay expired on December 10, 2024. On November 20, 2025, ICE arrested him at a scheduled biometric check-in, and USCIS issued a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa. He is detained at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, California, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention pending removal proceedings.
On December 8, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner's request for custody redetermination under § 1226(a) and denied bond, finding that he posed a flight risk. On February 25, 2026, the immigration judge denied a subsequent request for redetermination because Petitioner had not established materially changed circumstances concerning his flight risk. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where his appeal remains pending. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 28, 2026, challenging his continued detention under the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking immediate release or an individualized bond hearing before an impartial immigration judge. The district judge previously denied a motion for temporary restraining order, concluding Petitioner had received a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and had not challenged the merits of the immigration judge's bond determination.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends denying the petition in part as to the substantive and procedural due process claims and the INA claim on the merits. For substantive due process, the court found Petitioner failed to show his detention is punitive or excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose, noting the immigration judge found he posed a flight risk and that his administrative appeal remains pending. The court emphasized that no clearly defined duration makes immigration detention unconstitutional in every case, and that § 1226(a) provides procedures to challenge continued detention. For procedural due process, the court held that Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland forecloses Petitioner's argument that the government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence at his bond hearing, finding the procedures he received—initial bond hearing, appeal to the BIA, and opportunity to seek redetermination upon materially changed circumstances—constitutionally adequate as applied to him, even assuming his ten-month detention is prolonged.
The court declined to consider Petitioner's challenges to the immigration judge's flight-risk determination raised for the first time in reply, including arguments that the IJ relied on speculation and improperly characterized his pending asylum and Special Immigrant Juvenile Status applications. Even if considered, the court found these arguments do not establish an abuse of discretion on the limited record, noting the subsequent order states Petitioner failed to establish materially changed circumstances and that Martinez v. Clark does not permit the court to reweigh evidence. Independently, any challenge to the flight-risk determination is unexhausted because Petitioner's BIA appeal remains pending, and he has not established that administrative review would be futile or that an exception to exhaustion applies. The APA claim was dismissed without prejudice because the immigration judge's decision is on appeal to the BIA and therefore does not constitute final agency action subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 704.
Key Takeaways
- Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland establishes that § 1226(a) bond procedures—including an initial hearing, appeal to the BIA, and opportunity for redetermination upon materially changed circumstances—satisfy due process both facially and as applied, even for prolonged detention, and foreclose the argument that the government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
- Substantive due process does not categorically prohibit immigration detention of a particular duration; the petitioner must show detention has become punitive rather than regulatory in purpose and effect, which requires more than asserting lack of criminal history and community ties.
- Challenges to the merits of an immigration judge's flight-risk determination, including the weight given to specific factors, must be pursued through the administrative appeal process and cannot be reweighed by a district court in habeas proceedings.
- A petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas review of an adverse bond determination; a pending BIA appeal renders the immigration judge's decision non-final for APA purposes and unexhausted for habeas purposes.
- Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, rather than in the petition, need not be considered by the court.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit's framework in Rodriguez Diaz for evaluating due process challenges to immigration detention under § 1226(a), confirming that the existing procedural safeguards—initial bond hearing, BIA appeal, and redetermination upon changed circumstances—are constitutionally sufficient even for detentions approaching one year. The ruling clarifies that the burden of proof remains on the detainee at § 1226(a) bond hearings unless the government previously determined the noncitizen should be released, a narrow exception recognized in Rodriguez Pichardo. The decision also underscores the exhaustion requirement for challenges to factual determinations in bond proceedings and the finality requirement for APA review, channeling such challenges through the administrative process rather than federal habeas corpus.