Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Linh Khanh Nguyen, a native and citizen of Vietnam, entered the United States without inspection at the San Ysidro Port of Entry on December 21, 2025. The following day, she was paroled as a material witness in an alien smuggling case. On January 14, 2026, she was taken into custody and placed in expedited removal proceedings. Although she initially received a positive credible fear finding, an immigration judge ultimately denied her asylum application and ordered her removed to Vietnam, while granting withholding of removal to that country. Nguyen did not appeal, and the removal order became administratively final on April 23, 2026. She has remained in ICE custody continuously since her entry.
Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her continued detention exceeds statutory authority and violates due process. She also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The court recognized that under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, an alien granted withholding of removal must be detained for a 90-day removal period while the government seeks removal to a third country. After that period, detention is limited to a period reasonably necessary to effect removal and cannot be indefinite, per Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). A six-month post-removal detention period is presumptively reasonable; once it passes, the detainee must show good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Court’s Holding
The court found that Nguyen's final removal order became final on April 23, 2026, meaning she had been detained for six months post-removal-order, triggering the Zadvydas presumption of prolonged detention. Nguyen met her burden by demonstrating that her removal to Vietnam is legally prohibited by the grant of withholding of removal, and that the government acknowledged removal depends on locating an unidentified third country but had not identified any such country. The court concluded there is good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The burden then shifted to Respondents to rebut this showing. Respondents cited internal ICE communications from June through August 2026 showing requests to headquarters to initiate third-country removal and follow-ups, but headquarters repeatedly advised the request remained pending. The government did not explain when a third country might be secured. The court held that this correspondence indicates repeated unsuccessful efforts to finalize removal, and Respondents failed to rebut Nguyen's showing. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ordering Nguyen's immediate release under reasonable conditions of supervision and enjoining re-detention without compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 and due process. The motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot.
Key Takeaways
- Six months of post-removal-order detention triggers a presumption that continued detention is unreasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis.
- A grant of withholding of removal to the detainee's home country legally prohibits removal there, making third-country removal the only statutory path.
- The government's internal correspondence showing months of pending third-country removal requests without identification of a specific country fails to rebut a detainee's showing that removal is not significantly likely.
- When removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is not authorized by statute and the detainee must be released under reasonable conditions of supervision.
- A motion for a temporary restraining order becomes moot when the court grants the underlying habeas petition and orders release.
Why It Matters
This decision applies the Zadvydas framework to a detainee granted withholding of removal, reinforcing that statutory detention authority ends when removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable. The court's reliance on the government's own internal communications—showing months of unproductive efforts to secure a third country—as insufficient to rebut the detainee's prima facie case underscores that indefinite detention cannot be justified by bureaucratic process alone. The ruling clarifies that the government must demonstrate concrete progress toward removal, not merely ongoing administrative efforts, to justify continued post-removal-period detention.