Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Kristina Aghajanyan and her two children, N.M. (age nine) and H.M. (age five), fled Armenia in early September 2026, according to the petition. They entered the United States near the San Ysidro port of entry on September 18, 2026, were detained by Border Patrol, and have been held at the Chula Vista Sector Headquarters. The order describes that facility as a secure holding facility neither licensed for the care of children nor designed for families. The children's father lives in Los Angeles. A credible fear interview on September 20 produced a negative determination. An immigration judge vacated it as to Armenia but affirmed it as to Costa Rica, the alternative country of removal. Petitioners then received expedited removal orders to Costa Rica and remained in custody.
Petitioners sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on three theories. The first was detention in an unlicensed facility in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA). The second was custody without lawful authority under 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d), CBP's TEDS standards and the Fifth Amendment. The third was the absence of a validly issued expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). Respondents, federal immigration officials, filed a return on October 7, 2026, contesting jurisdiction, and petitioners filed a traverse on October 9. Because relief was warranted on the first claim, the court did not reach the second or third.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that it had jurisdiction over the FSA claim. Section 1252(f)(1) and Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez bar class-wide injunctive relief but, by the statute's terms, not relief for an individual alien, and petitioners sought relief only for themselves. Respondents cited no authority holding the FSA unenforceable, and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly enforced it. The jurisdiction-stripping provisions in sections 1252(g), (a)(2)(A) and (e) did not apply because the claim challenges present custody, not removal proceedings or the removal order. Under Pinson v. Carvajal, a challenge to the legal basis of detention, as opposed to its conditions, lies at the core of habeas, where release is the typical remedy.
On the merits, the court explained that the FSA ordinarily requires the government, within three days, either to release a minor to a capable custodian or to place the minor in a state-licensed, non-secure facility. Release is mandatory if the minor presents neither a flight nor a safety risk and a qualified custodian is available. Petitioners alleged that the children had been held nearly a month in an unlicensed, secure facility and that their father stood ready to take them. Respondents did not contest those allegations or justify the failure to release or transfer the children. On that record, the court found the continued detention of N.M. and H.M. unlawful and granted the petition.
The court ordered Respondents to transfer all petitioners, as a family unit, to an FSA-compliant facility immediately. If that is not practicable, Respondents must release N.M. and H.M. to their father. Either way, they must file a notice of compliance by October 30, 2026. The Clerk was directed to close the case. A footnote acknowledges that, because the FSA applies only to minors, Ms. Aghajanyan's detention may not be unlawful under this claim. It adds that the court lacks jurisdiction to order humanitarian parole for her and urges Respondents to consider parole to preserve family unity.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1252(f)(1) and Aleman Gonzalez did not stop this court from enforcing the FSA in an individual habeas case, because the statute excepts relief applied to an individual alien.
- A claim that challenges the lawfulness of present custody, rather than a removal order or removal proceedings, falls outside the section 1252 jurisdiction-stripping provisions that Respondents invoked.
- A challenge to the legal basis of detention, as opposed to its conditions, is cognizable in habeas under Pinson because release is the remedy if the detention is unlawful.
- The relief is narrow and conditional: transfer of the family to an FSA-compliant facility, or release of the children to their father if transfer is impracticable. The mother's separate status and the expedited removal orders were not decided.
- The mother's detention was not held unlawful, and the court said it cannot order humanitarian parole, so any parole decision rests with Respondents.
Why It Matters
The order is a district-court ruling in a case it closes, so it is not binding precedent. It illustrates how one court treats Respondents' argument that Aleman Gonzalez forecloses FSA enforcement: individual petitioners may proceed in habeas even though class-wide injunctive relief is barred.
The case also shows the limits of FSA-based relief for accompanied families. The FSA protects minors, and the court left the parent's detention, the validity of the expedited removal orders, and the other two claims undecided, with the parole question resting in Respondents' discretion.