Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Charles Perretti filed this action for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On August 26, 2025, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. The parties subsequently stipulated to an award of $9,700 in attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. On remand, the Commissioner granted Perretti's application and awarded disability benefits. The Notice of Award states that Perretti's past-due benefits for April 2021 through June 2026 total $143,929, and the Social Security Administration withheld 25 percent of that amount, $35,982.25, to pay his representative.
Attorney Katherine R. Siegfried filed the present motion for fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), on September 7, 2026. Under a contingent-fee agreement signed March 13, 2025, Perretti agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits award. The government did not file a response, and Perretti did not object to the motion. Siegfried's declaration reflects 48.4 hours of work on the case, yielding an effective hourly rate of approximately $743.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Siegfried's motion for $35,982.25 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The court found that the contingent-fee agreement providing for 25% of past-due benefits is consistent with the statutory cap and that Siegfried met her burden of demonstrating the fee's reasonableness. There was no evidence of substandard performance; to the contrary, counsel's representation resulted in Perretti receiving past-due benefits. The court cited prior decisions in this district awarding Siegfried 25% under similar contingent-fee agreements where plaintiffs received benefits upon remand.
The court found the effective hourly rate of about $743, based on 48.4 itemized hours, in line with rates approved in this district, citing decisions approving effective rates between roughly $1,325 and $1,562. It stressed that the lodestar method is not the governing standard, because it under-compensates attorneys for the risk they assume, and that courts should generally defer to winning counsel's judgment about the time needed. The court also weighed complexity and risk. When counsel took the case in March 2025, the claim had been denied at every level of administrative review, and any fee depended on obtaining both a remand and a favorable decision on remand. Nothing suggested delay, since the parties stipulated to remand roughly five months after filing, and counsel will receive no share of ongoing monthly benefits. The court directed the Commissioner to certify $35,982.25 under § 406(b), payable to counsel, and ordered counsel to refund the $9,700 EAJA award to Plaintiff, because under Gisbrecht the attorney refunds the smaller of the two fees.
Key Takeaways
- The court awarded the full 25% contingent fee ($35,982.25) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) where counsel secured a favorable remand and subsequent award of past-due benefits.
- The effective hourly rate of $743 was deemed reasonable and consistent with prior awards in the Northern District of California, which have approved rates exceeding $1,300.
- The lodestar method is not the starting point for § 406(b) reasonableness analysis; courts begin with the contingent-fee agreement and test it for reasonableness.
- Counsel must refund the smaller EAJA fee award ($9,700) to the claimant when both EAJA and § 406(b) fees are awarded.
- The court considered the risk of non-payment when counsel accepted the case after denial at all administrative levels, and the absence of delay in achieving remand.
Why It Matters
This unopposed order applies the Gisbrecht and Crawford framework. The court begins with the contingent-fee agreement, tests it for reasonableness, and treats an hourly-rate comparison only as an aid. It approved an effective rate of about $743, below the higher rates it cited from other district awards. That suggests a fee at the 25% cap is likely to be approved where performance is sound, there is no delay, and the claim carried real risk.
The order is an unreported ruling by a magistrate judge on a single fee motion, so it carries no precedential weight and resolves only this fee request. It also illustrates the EAJA offset: counsel refunds the smaller EAJA award to the claimant, so the claimant bears only the single § 406(b) fee, paid out of past-due benefits.