California Case Summaries

Dennis Shipman v. Wells Fargo Advisors, et al. — Court screens pro se complaint, finds conversion claim against Wells Fargo but dismisses Chubb Ltd. with leave to amend

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Dennis Shipman v. Wells Fargo Advisors, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Judge
Rita F. Lin (Joseph R. Biden Jr., 2023)
Date Decided
2026-10-23
Docket No.
3:26-cv-11894
Status
Unreported
Topics
in forma pauperis screening, conversion, preliminary injunction, service of process, dismissal with leave to amend, pro se litigation

Background

Dennis Shipman, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint against Wells Fargo Advisors and Chubb Ltd. alleging conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices under California Business & Professions Code § 17200, financial elder abuse under California Welfare & Institutions Code § 15610.30, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The core factual allegation is that Wells Fargo withheld a $2,078.22 deposit and refused to allow Shipman to access or transfer the funds despite repeated requests. Shipman also filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking return of the funds and an order preventing Wells Fargo from blocking further transfers during litigation.

The court conducted mandatory screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of any complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Applying the pleading standard from Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the court liberally construed Shipman's pro se pleadings per Ninth Circuit precedent. The court's review was limited to the complaint and attached documents.

The Court’s Holding

The court held that Shipman's complaint, when liberally construed, states a plausible claim for conversion against Wells Fargo Advisors under California law, which defines conversion as any act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with their rights. The allegation that Wells Fargo accepted a $2,078.22 deposit and subsequently refused to allow access or transfer of the funds despite repeated requests contains sufficient factual matter to survive screening.

Conversely, the court held that the complaint fails to state any claim against Chubb Ltd. Shipman's attached memorandum identifies Chubb as an insurance company, but the complaint contains no factual allegations explaining how an insurance company participated in the conversion of a bank deposit. The bare allegations that both defendants acted to deprive Shipman of funds and denied disability accommodations constitute threadbare recitals insufficient under Iqbal. The court dismissed claims against Chubb with leave to amend by November 13, 2026, noting that an amended complaint must be complete in itself and cannot rely on prior pleadings.

The court ordered service of the complaint and preliminary injunction motion on Wells Fargo Advisors via the U.S. Marshals. Wells Fargo must file an opposition to the preliminary injunction motion by December 3, 2026, with Shipman's reply due December 10, 2026. The motion will be heard on December 17, 2026 at 10:00 AM via Zoom videoconference. The court declined to address the sufficiency of Shipman's other claims (breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices, financial elder abuse, ADA) at this screening stage because at least one claim survives.

Key Takeaways

  • Pro se complaints are liberally construed but must still contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief under the Iqbal/Twombly standard.
  • A conversion claim under California law requires allegations of wrongful dominion over personal property inconsistent with the owner's rights; a deposit refusal can satisfy this standard.
  • Defendants cannot be joined based on bare allegations or threadbare recitals; each defendant must be linked to the alleged wrongdoing by specific factual allegations.
  • Dismissal with leave to amend under § 1915 requires a deadline for filing an amended complaint that stands alone and supersedes the original pleading.
  • When at least one claim survives screening, courts may defer analysis of remaining claims to later stages of litigation.

Why It Matters

This order illustrates the application of mandatory § 1915 screening in the Northern District of California, demonstrating how courts balance liberal construction of pro se pleadings with the plausibility pleading standard. The decision clarifies that a simple allegation of a bank refusing to release deposited funds can state a conversion claim, while also reinforcing that corporate affiliates or related entities (here, an insurer) cannot be swept into litigation without specific factual allegations connecting them to the alleged misconduct. The case remains pending on the conversion claim and preliminary injunction motion against Wells Fargo.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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