Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Spencer Kaidi filed a putative class action in Napa County Superior Court alleging T-Mobile USA, Inc. installed third-party trackers on visitors' browsers at www.t-mobile.com in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511) and various California laws. T-Mobile removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). The court, reviewing the complaint sua sponte, identified concerns about subject matter jurisdiction and ordered T-Mobile to show cause why the case should not be remanded for lack of Article III standing.
The court outlined the legal framework: federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury in fact, causation, and redressability. In a putative class action, at least one named plaintiff must have standing. As the removing party, T-Mobile bears the burden of establishing removal is proper, including the plaintiff's Article III standing. The court cited Ninth Circuit authority holding that a case removed under CAFA where the named plaintiff lacks standing must be remanded.
The Court’s Holding
The court found the complaint fails to allege a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The complaint generically alleges trackers collected "identifying information and Website activity" and "IP addresses and other user behavior data" but does not allege what specific data was collected from Kaidi, what targeted advertising he received, or how the collection was highly offensive. Relying on Popa v. Microsoft Corp. (9th Cir. 2025) and district court decisions including Wooten v. BioLife Plasma Services and Carolus v. Nexstar Media, the court held that disclosure of email and IP addresses without more does not resemble the highly offensive interferences actionable at common law. The court further noted Kaidi has not alleged facts supporting an inference that any information was actually collected about him personally.
Accordingly, the court ordered T-Mobile to show cause in writing by October 29, 2026, why the action should not be remanded to Napa County Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The order does not decide the merits of the underlying claims or rule on remand; it requires the defendant to address the standing deficiency identified by the court.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff alleging privacy violations from website trackers must allege specific facts showing the collected data was embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise highly offensive to establish a concrete Article III injury.
- Generic allegations of IP address and website activity collection, without more, are insufficient for standing under Ninth Circuit precedent.
- The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing the named plaintiff's Article III standing to support federal jurisdiction.
- Courts may raise Article III standing sua sponte at any stage, including after removal, and order show-cause briefing on remand.
- The order is procedural and does not dismiss the case or rule on the merits; it requires the defendant to justify federal jurisdiction.
Why It Matters
This order reflects the Northern District of California's rigorous application of TransUnion and Popa to website-tracking class actions, signaling that plaintiffs must plead specific, highly offensive data collection—not merely the presence of trackers or collection of IP addresses—to invoke federal jurisdiction. It underscores the removing defendant's burden to prove standing and the court's willingness to sua sponte police subject matter jurisdiction, potentially leading to remand where complaints rely on generic privacy allegations. The decision aligns with a trend of courts scrutinizing intangible harm allegations in digital privacy litigation at the threshold.